The ABC\u27s of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court and Current Complexities by Editors, Various
Volume 10 Issue 4 Article 14 
1965 
The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The 
Court and Current Complexities 
Various Editors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Various Editors, The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court and Current 
Complexities, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 734 (1965). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
[VOL. 10
NOTE
THE ABC'S OF CLAYTON 7: AMENDMENT OF 1950;
BROWN SHOE;
THE COURT AND CURRENT COMPLEXITIESt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. IN TROD U CTIO N ....................................................................................................................... 736
II. PRE-CLAYTON HISTORY: THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE "RULE
OF R EA SO N ". ............................................................................................................................ 736
III. T H E C LAYTON A CT OF 1914 ....................................................................................... 740
A . L egislative H istory ................................................................................................. 740
B . Judicial Interpretation ..................................................  744
1. "may be to substantially lessen competition between
the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition". ............................................... 744
2. "to restrain commerce in any section or community" 747
3. "tend to create a monopoly" .................... ........... 748
C . T he L egislative L oophole ................................................................................... 748
IV. THE 1950 AMENDMENT ............................................................................................. 750
A . C ongressional D ebate ......................................................................................... 750
B. Substantive Changes in Section 7 ........... . ........ 754
C . Judicial Interpretation ........................................................................................ 756
1. Degree of Concentration in the Industry ................................... 757
2. Market Share - Dollar and Volume Considerations 759
3. Ease of Entry into the Relevant Industry ................................ 760
4. Countervailing Power ............ ......................... 760
t Editor's Note: The Recent Developments section of the Rivlmw has been
omitted from this issue only. This Note represents the combined efforts of staff
members of the VILLANOVA LAW Rnvivw. Included among the contributors are:
William T. Define, Thomas J. Tornalis, Thomas J. Tumola, Edward J. O'Malley,
Conrad J. DeSantis, Richard A. Wilmans, Robert 0. Mickler, Richard H. Zamboldi.
(734)
1
Editors: The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SUMMER 1965]
5. Elimination of a Substantial Competitor .................................... 761
6. Restrictions on Supply Outlets and Competitive
Opportunities in the Market for Others ....................................... 761
7. Miscellaneous Factors ................................................................................. 762
V. BROWN SHOE: THE OMNIFIC OPINION ......................................................... 764
A. The Economic Setting ......................................................................................... 764
B . T he R elevant M arket ........................................................................................... 766
C. The Effect on Competition ................................................................................ 777
1. T he V ertical L evel .......................................................................................... 777
(a) The Share Foreclosed ..................................................................... 778
(b) Exclusionary Practices .................................................................. 779
(c) The Incipiency Theory .................................................................... 780
(d) Social Policy and Congressional Intent ........................... 781
(e) Recognized Defenses ........................................................................ 782
2. T he H orizontal L evel .................................................................................... 784
(a) The Market Share .............................................................................. 784
(b) F uture M ergers .................................................................................... 785
(c) The Large Chain Operation ...................................................... 785
(d) Advantages of an Integregated Complex ........................ 786
VI. PNB: PRESUMPTIVE ILLEGALITY ........................................................................... 786
VII. CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ............................................................................................. 790
V III. A GEN CY E N FORCEM ENT ................................................................................................... 792
A. Criteria For Commencing Actions ....................... 792
1. The Merger of Law and Economics ................................................ 793
2. The Effect of Size ................................ 796
B. Responsible Formulation ................................................................................. 798
C . P roposed R eform s ................................................................................................... 800
1. A N ew Ingredient .......................................................................................... 800









From the voluminous writings in the antitrust area one might be
inclined to presume that the field has been effectively foreclosed. Further
investigation, however, reveals that these efforts stand rather as im-
pressive testimony to the complex and controversial nature of the
subject. Indeed, much of this literature, contributed by economists and
businessmen, is directed primarily at criticizing the underlying policy,
rather than analyzing courts' decisions within the existing framework.
Thus, when one delimits from the broad area of antitrust literature the
narrower market with which the lawyer is concerned, it seems that
further writing should not be proscribed.
It is on this assumption that the following note is predicated. Its
scope and purpose is to present an historically oriented discussion of
Amended Section 7, with particular emphasis upon the landmark Brown
Shoe decision. While proposals for further legislative action are con-
sidered, the focus is upon telescoping the past seventy-five years of
development in order to place the decisions of the courts in proper
perspective. This approach serves to emphasize the current decisional
trend, thereby facilitating a prediction of how the courts should react to
future anti-merger litigation.
II.
PRE-CLAYTON HISTORY: THE SHERMAN ACT AND
THE "RULE OF REASON"*
The attitude of the American people toward great combinations of
capital, be they termed monopolies or trusts, has traditionally been one
of distrust and hostility. At the roots of this attitude lay both economic
philosophy and the effects of hard, practical experience. Long before
the Civil War, the view was widely adopted in this country that indi-
viduals, if left free to exercise their own judgment as regards business
affairs, would, through competition, achieve the desired economic goals
of fair prices, quality products, and the elimination of inefficiency in
production. Underlying this philosophy was the traditional belief that
the right to enter the business or profession of one's choice is inherent
in a democratic society. On the practical side was the lingering memory
of the oppressive business practices of the English mercantile and in-
dustrial interests, practices that threatened to vest economic control of
this young nation in the hands of a foreign power.'
Given this background, it is not difficult to understand the growing
concern of the American nation over the discernible increase in varied
* William T. Define, Thomas J. Tomalis.
1. See MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 4 (1959); THE ANTITRUST
LAWS OV THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 22 (1962).
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forms of business combinations, a growth having its beginnings in the
post-Civil War era. With the advent of railroads and steam ships, and
the great economic changes and adjustments brought about by the
tremendous advances in our industrial life, an era of active combination
began to dawn. The opening of new markets through rapid methods of
transportation, the growing needs of modern machinery, the reduction
in freight rates, and the advances in industries generally all contributed
to this end. Financiers and capitalists everywhere undertook to com-
bine and pool their interests and enterprises. Gigantic business combi-
nations began to control the markets and establish monopolies in their
particular line.
2
The first industrial combination of large size, the Standard Oil trust,
was created in 1879.3 In the succeeding decade others followed rapidly,
using the trustee form of organization.4 However, posing an even larger
problem at that time were the various kinds of loose agreements between
firms on price and output policy.5
It soon became apparent that neither the common law nor state
legislation could provide an adequate remedy 6 and, therefore, the
problem became a leading national issue in the campaign of 1888. In
response to President Harrison's message urging "earnest attention" to
the trust problem, numerous anti-trust bills were introduced in Congress
in 1888 and 1889.7 The ultimate outcome was the passage of the Sherman
Act8 on July 2, 1890, the first federal legislation giving expression to
the traditional faith in the free enterprise system.
However, the Sherman Act had little immediate practical effect.
Because its provisions were couched in sweeping generalities making
judicial interpretation of paramount importance, the formation of busi-
ness combinations continued apace in the absence of judicial action,
slowed only by the panic of 1893. The ineffectual ruling of the Knight
2. Naujoks, Monopoly and Restraint of Trade Under the Sherman Act, 4 Wis.
L. Rzv. 387 (1928), at 419-20.
3. MARTIN, supra note 1, at 4. See generally WESTON, THE ROLE or MERGERS IN
THE GROWTH op LARGE FIRMS 31-61 (1953); NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956 (1959).
4. See Markham, "Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers," Business
Concentration and Price Policy, a Conference of the Universities - National Bureau
Committee for Economic Research 157 (1955).
5. See PEGRUM, REGULATION OF INDUSTRY 143 (1949).
6. The various states were impotent or ineffectual in their attempts to curb the
growth of monopolies because their jurisdiction was limited to their territorial bounds
while the new titanic business combinations carried on business throughout the country.
7. See PURDY, LINDAHL, and CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 302 (1942).
8. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), formally termed "An act to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies." The act provides in relevant part that
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" is
illegal, and that "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor."
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case,9 the first judicial attempt at interpretation of the Sherman Act, was
followed by what is generally considered to be the most significant period
of combination activity at any time in the long development of the present
corporate structure. 10
The decision in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n"
provided the initial effective utilization of the Act. Eighteen railroads
entered into an agreement whereby they consented to maintain, between
competitive points, such rates as a majority of their number should
proscribe. It was further stipulated that if any member should lower
its rates without obtaining the prior approval of the association it would
be subject to a fine.
The Supreme Court, in a opinion by Mr. Justice Peckham, out-
lawed the combination. The Act of July 2, 1890, was construed as rendering
illegal all contracts in restraint of trade, even though they be reasonable
and of the type permitted at common law. Since the agreement under
consideration clearly fell within the statutory language as interpreted
by the Court, the Association was ordered to disband.
In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice White,' 2 speaking for a four
member minority, argued that "restraint of trade" was a technical phrase,
embodying only those contracts which were unreasonable and therefore
illegal at common law. In support of this position he undertook an ex-
tensive examination of the Congressional Record, while the majority was
content to ignore this source. Whatever the merit of this contention, the
decision established that the Act had overturned the common law rule.
Two years later, in the case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States'3 the Court held illegal a price-fixing arrangement which had
enabled six producers of cast iron pipe to maintain unreasonable prices.
Since the combination directly affected interstate commerce, and not
merely the local incident of production, the Knight case was distinguished
and the Sherman Act held applicable.
However, as the case only involved a loose combination of firms it
had little effectiveness in stemming the merger movement of the late
nineties.
14
Rather, the end of the first great combination movement coincided
with the second important Sherman Act case,15 one dealing with the
applicability of the antitrust statute to combinations formed by the
device of a holding corporation.
9. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
10. Markham's study, op. cit. supra note 3 shows 257 combinations involving
4,227 plants during the period from 1897 to 1904. Another study, SSAGER and GULICK,
TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1929), showed that 225 combinations were
organized from 1897 to 1903. Over a thousand firms disappeared by merger during
the year of 1899 alone.
11. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
12. Id. at 343-47 (dissenting opinion).
13. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), affirming on appeal the opinion of Mr. Justice Taft at
85 Fed. 271, and adopting his reasoning almost in toto.
14. See PURDY, LINDAHL, and CARTER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 310.
15. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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In the Northern Securities case, two parallel and competing railroads
combined to eliminate rivalry between themselves, although competition
continued to be supplied by other transcontinental roads. In requiring
the dissolution of the combination, the Supreme Court held that: (1)
all direct restraints of trade are unlawful, and not only those unreasonable
in their nature; and (2) that a combination need not be shown to result
in a complete suppression of trade. Rather it suffices that, by its natural
operation, it tends to create a monopoly and to deprive the public
of the advantages of competition. The case held conclusively that a
combination formed under a state holding corporation charter was not
sufficient to remove it from the federal government's jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act.
This case provided the first victory in the Supreme Court for the
government in a case involving a close knit combination. Moreover, it
dispelled any illusion that the holding company device could be used
to create a monopoly with immunity. The decision appears to have been
an important factor in determining the form both of some important existing
combinations as well as some formed subsequently. 16
The next important decisions to be handed down were the 1911 oil
and tobacco cases, 17 which concerned the legality of combinations brought
about either through stock or asset acquisitions. These decisions proved to
be somewhat ironical in that although the Sherman Act proved adequate
to dissolve the combinations involved, the Court's interpretation of the
Act pointed out the inherent weaknesses which led eventually to the
need for the Clayton Act.
The American Tobacco Company had developed through a series of
both stock and asset acquisitions, while the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey was primarily a holding company effected through the acquisition of
stock alone. In neither case did the Court concern itself with the legality
of a particular asset or stock acquisition, but rather it dealt with the
combination as a whole, and the purposes and results of its organization.
While the government's victory in these cases demonstrated that a
combination of manufacturing concerns could be dissolved regardless of
whether organized as a holding company or as a single corporation, both
cases involved actions of the defendant so obviously pointed toward
domination of their respective markets that the same decision would have
resulted under almost any interpretation of the Sherman Act. The im-
portance of the cases lies in the fact that defendants were found to
have violated the Sherman Act not because of a restraint of trade, but
16. For example, the tobacco combination in 1904 shifted its organization from
the holding company form to an asset-owning corporation, allegedly because of the
Supreme Court decision. While the Northern Securities case was in progress, the
International Harvester Company was organized by uniting under th6 ownership of
one corporation the properties of several previously independent corporations. MARTIN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 14-15.
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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because of an unreasonable restraint of trade. The cases enunciated the
now famous "Rule of Reason", which Mr. Chief Justice White articulated
as follows: ". . . the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the
purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been
committed is the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the
plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act, and thus the public
policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve."'u
These decisions evoked a torrent of criticism which, though unjustified
in light of subsequent history,' 9 had immediate positive effects. The
Democratic party was moved to make the following statement in its
national platform of 1912: "We regret that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
has received judicial construction depriving it of much of its efficacy,
and we favor the enactment of legislation which will restore to the
statute the strength of which it has been deprived by such interpretation."
Thus, after 1911, for reasons both valid and invalid, a legislative
adjunct to the Sherman Act was sought. The contention that the "rule
of reason" had emasculated the Act was, however, entirely lacking in
merit. To the contrary, the "rule of reason" was to become a valuable
guide in resolving litigation under the Sherman Act.2 0 But while effective
as a deterrent to monopolistic combinations, the Act lacked definite
criteria by which to judge the legality of a particular acquisition of stock
or assets. Therefore, while monopolies could not be formed all at once,
they could still be created piece-meal. Consequently, this latter form
became the principal method of effecting further mergers. And as merger
activity continued to increase, so did the demand for legislative reform.
III.
THE CLAYTON ACT OF 1914
A. Legislative History
Dissatisfaction with existing legislation thrust anti-trust policy to
the foreground in the presidential campaign of 1912.21 Following the
election, President Wilson, in his message to Congress, called for the
18. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
19. A commentor close to the scene made the following observation concerning
the effect of the oil and tobacco decisions on the future vitality of the Sherman Act:
"A uniform course of decisions by the Supreme Court since 1911 shows that the
'rule of reason' was invoked in those two cases, not for the purpose of narrowing the
scope and force of the Sherman Law, but for the purpose of enlarging same, and that
in later decisions, the Sherman Law was enforced with a degree of vigor which
approximated the maximum power of law. It was due to the fact that the mandates
of the [C]ourt in these two cases were improperly executed, and not because of any
weakness in construction placed on the Sherman Law, that the dissolution of the
two great trusts affected met with widespread and just censure." Levy, The Clayton
Law - An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 6 VA. L. Rev. 411 (1916),
at 415.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 372 (1929),
which elucidates the "rule of reason."
21. See HtNDERsON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1-48 (1924) for a
detailed account of the political and legislative history of the 1914 legislation.
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establishment of a trade commission to regulate corporate activity and
arrest the growth of holding companies, although making no specific
mention of mergers or asset acquisitions. 22 In response thereto, a bill
was introduced in Congress entitled: "An Act to supplement existing
laws against unlawful monopolies, and for other purposes." The House
Judiciary Committee reported the holding company section (originally
Section 8 but later numbered Section 7) to the floor on May 6, 1914.23
The outright prohibitions contained in the House bill were further sup-
plemented by criminal provisions which made any violation of the section
a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. After considerable
debate on the floor, the bill was passed as originally reported by a vote
of 277 to 54.24
The Senate Judiciary Committee then began the legislative dissection
of the .House bill. It recommended the substitution of "commerce" for
"trade" and that the words "in any section or community" be stricken
because the committee believed that ".... they are either surplusage, when
applied to 'commerce' as defined in the bill; or if they are used in a
more restricted sense, in a sense which would apply them to local trans-
actions merely, they would attempt to regulate intrastate commerce
and be therefore void."'25 Furthermore, the Committee recommended
the striking of the criminal provisions of the House bill and the addition
of a new section providing for the administration, by the newly-created
Federal Trade Commission, of those provisions which dealt with prohibi-
tions of corporate practices.
2 6
The Senate voted to strike the criminal provisions of the House
bill and amended the new section recommended by the Senate Judiciary
Committee to make the procedure conform to that established by Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.27 The Senate further amended
22. Message to Congress of January 20, 1914, 51 CONG. Ric. 1963 (1914).
23. H.R. Rm No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914). The section was worded
as follows with the phrases which later became points of contention italicized:
Sec. 8. That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another cor-
poration engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition is to
eliminate or substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to create a monopoly
of any line of ti'ade in any section or community.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of. the
stock or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in commerce where
the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, is to eliminate or substantially lessen competition between such
corporations, or any of them, whose stock or other share capital is so acquired, or to
create a monopoly of any line of trade in any section or community.
24. 51 CoNG. Rc. 9911 (1914).
25. S. ltp. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1914).
26. Id. at 48.
27. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958). Section 5 provided
that "unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
These "unfair methods" were not defined but rather it was left to the FTC to deter-
mine whether such methods were used. See Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 VIrL. L. Rtv. 517
(1962), for a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of Section 5.
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the bill by striking out the words "eliminate or" in the first and second
paragraphs because competition would necessarily be lessened if elimi-
nated.28  At this point, amendments were offered to strengthen the
standard of illegality under Section 7. Senator Reed proposed that the
first paragraph be amended by eliminating the "substantial lessening
of competition" test in favor of an unequivocal prohibition of one corpora-
tion acquiring the stock of another entity engaged in the same line of
business.29 Another proposal advocated the absolute prohibition of inter-
corporate stockholding.30 Both of these efforts (to strengthen the standard
of legality) were defeated upon subsequent votes.
However, other important amendments which resulted in significant
changes in the standard of illegality were approved by the Senate. The
Senate substituted the words "may be" for "is" and struck out the
word "substantially" (without debate) in the first and second paragraphs
so that acquisitions were prohibited where the effect may be to lessen
competition. The basis for the change was the Supreme Court decision in
the Northern Securities31 case, which held that under the Sherman Act
it was necessary to prove merely that the power to restrain trade had
been created. As a result, the Senate met the House objections that the
standard was weaker than that of the Sherman Act.
32
On September 2, 1914, the Clayton bill as amended was passed by the
Senate and a Conference Committee composed of members of both
houses was established to iron out the differences in the two versions of
the bill. The committee reinstated the word "substantially" which had
been stricken by the Senate. It accepted the Senate's amendment which
struck out the words "in any section or community" but insisted on
changing the phrase to read "or tend to create a monopoly." Additionally,
in order to place a geographical limitation on the extent of all the market
in which the effect must be felt, the Committee inserted a new phrase
prohibiting a stock acquisition where the "effect . . . may be to . . .
restrain such commerce in any section or community." The compromise
bill was subsequently discussed and approved in both houses and Presi-
dent Wilson signed the bill on October 15, 1914.
3
3
28. 51 CONG. R c. 14419 (1914).
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 14454.
31. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
32. 51 CONG. RPc. 14464 (1914).
33. 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The first two sections of the original Section 7 which
became law:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a mononoly of any line of commerce.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in
commerce where the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock by the
[VOL. 10
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The Clayton Act represented a compromise between the House
bill, which contained provisions designed to supplement the criminal
sanctions of the Sherman Act, and the Senate theory that the newly
created Federal Trade Commission rendered further legislation un-
necessary.
During the legislature's consideration and development of the Act,
the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the Act's primary purpose
was to destroy the seeds of monopoly before they blossomed forth into
an uncontrollable chokeweed upon the national economy when its chair--
man said:
Broadly stated, the bill in its treatment of unlawful restraints and
monopolies, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful cert ain trade
practices which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are not covered
by the act of July 2, 1890, or other existing antitrust acts, and thus,
by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts,
conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consum-
mation.3
4
The first paragraph of Section 7 was to apply to operating companies
which held stock in another firm, whereas the second paragraph was
intended primarily to relate to holding companies which owed the stock
of two or more firms. Certain exemptions appeared from other provisions
of Section 7. For example, stock purchases solely for investment purposes
and holding stocks of subsidiary companies for the actual carrying on of
lawful business were permitted, so long as the standard of illegality in
Section 7 was not violated.
The Clayton Act also contained several provisions for the administra-
tion of the Act generally and Section 7 specifically. Section 435 enabled
a person injured by a violation of the antitrust laws to sue in a federal
district court for treble damages. Section 1636 provided that any person
or corporation may seek injunctive relief against threatened loss resulting
from violations of any of the antitrust laws, including Sections 2, 3, 7 and
8 of the Clayton Act. Section 1537 invested the federal district courts with
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of the Clayton Act, and
stated that it is the duty of the United States District Attorney, under
the direction of the Attorney General, to institute suits in equity to
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen com-
petition between such corporations, or any of them, whose stock or other share
capital is so acquired, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community,
or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
34. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). But see Irvine, The Uncer-
tainties of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 28 (1928) and Note, 38
YALn L.J. 830 (1929), where it is argued that the principal purpose of the Clayton
Act was not to supplement the Sherman Act by attacking monopolies in their incipiency
but rather to reduce business uncertainty by the enumeration of outlawed practices.
35. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
36. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958).
37. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
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enjoin such violations. Finallr, Section 1188 gave the Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Reserve Board and the Interstate Commerce
Commission authority to enforce compliance with Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8.
In concluding .the legislative history, it might be interesting to note
just where Congress intended the Clayton Act to be applicable. Clearly,"
Section 7 was intended to apply only to the then prevailing method of
making corporate acquisitions, that is, stock acquisitions, and not to
asset acquisitions. It was further directed only at "horizontal" mergers,
that is, the acquisition by the acquiring firm of a firm which was in the
same line of business, and not at "vertical" mergers, that is, the acquisition
by one firm of another involved in an earlier or later stage of production
or distribution of a product which the acquiring firm manufactured or
sold. Nor was it aimed at "conglomerate" or "circuitous" mergers, that is,
the acquisition of a business producing or selling totally unrelated products.
B. Judicial Interpretation
The courts, in attempting to interpret the language of Section 7, often
made reference to other sections of the Clayton Act wherein similar
language appeared. Section 2 prohibits price discrimination "where the
effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. . . ."39 Section 3
bars exclusive dealing and tying agreements "where the effect . . . may
be to-substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce. '40 However, there are basic differences between these
two sections and Section 7; for example, the use of the word "or" between
the three qualifying phrases in Section 7 to imply that they are meant
to be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, since the courts have consistently
turned to cases decided under Sections 2 and 3 to resolve Section 7 cases,
their importance cannot be overlooked.
1. "may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose, stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition"
The words "may be" were equated to a "reasonable probability", a
definition given in an early Section 3 case 4' which was to stand unassailed
for more than twenty-five years. In this case, the Supreme Court declared
that it did not consider it to have been the intent of Congress in using
the words "may be" to prohibit the mere possibility, but rather the
probability that there would be a substantial lessening of competition or
tendency to create a monopoly. The Court buttressed its reasoning by
pointing out that the requirement of a substantial lessening of competition
38. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
39. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
40. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. J 14 (1958).
41. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922);
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir. 1922), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
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further indicated that Section 3 was not aimed at every diminution of
competition. This interpretation was later adopted in Section 7 cases
40 2
and was regarded as settled law until FTC v. Morton Salt Co.43 In this
Section 2 case, decided in 1948, the Court held that the Commission
had authority to act upon the "reasonable possibility" that a violation
of Section 2 had been committed. This standard, however, has since
been limited exclusively to Section 2 cases; for in 1949, the Court, in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,44 quoted the "reasonable probability"
rule from Standard Fashion and considered it to be settled law.
The alternative tests set up by Section 7 - the substantial lessening of
competition; the restraint of commerce in any section or community; the
tendency to create a monopoly - all involve economic factors which must
necessarily be determined by the application of legal principles. Thus
there arose the question whether the test under the Clayton Act was
broader in scope than that of Section 1 of the Sherman Act which
prohibits combinations that unreasonably restrain trade.
Prior to the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court decided in the famous
oil trust and tobacco cases 5 that not every restraint upon competition
fell within the scope of the Sherman Act, but only those which were
so unreasonable in extent as to be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus,
the "rule of reason" became an integral part of the Sherman Act. How-
ever, in the Standard Fashion case, the Court refused to apply this standard
in Section 7 cases. Since the Clayton Act was intended to supplement the
Sherman Act, the Court ruled that it was necessary to establish a separate
test for cases arising under the new Act.
46
A Section 7 case in 1922 declared that the qualifying phrases of
Section 7 were mutually exclusive and that the reasonableness of the
transaction would not be considered.47 The Court held that the effect,
42. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 651
(1934) ; International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
43. 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See the strong dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurred in by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who argues that the use of "reasonable
possibility" in a previous Section 3 case. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324
U.S. 726 (1945), was inadvertent.
However, in Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594 (1953), the Court
recognized that the Clayton Act contained more specific standards which illuminate
the public policy which the Sherman Act was designed to subserve, and held in refer-
ence to Section 3 that an inference of the requisite potential lessening of competition
may be found when either the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for
the tying product or a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained.
Conversely, both conditions would have to be met for a Sherman Act violation to
be found.
44. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
45. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
46. But see the Section 3 case of Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir.
1922), aff'd, 261 U.S. 463 (1923), where the circuit court applied the standard of
illegality used in Sherman Act cases.
47. Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied,
261 U.S. 616 (1923). Alcoa agreed with its sole competitor in the sheet aluminum
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and not the motive behind the transaction, was the primary issue under
consideration. The fact that a "seller's market" existed at the time of
the acquisition, rendering the trade for the seller's goods competitive, did
not affect the decision, since market was considered irrelevant in de-
termining the applicability of Section 7.
4
1
However, the International Shoe decision,49 which involved probably
the most important application of the qualifying phrase of Section 7, virtually
overruled the Alcoa decision and greatly reduced the significance of the
"substantially lessen" test. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for a 6-3
majority, established the "public interest" test for Section 7 cases when
he declared:
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as its terms and the nature of the remedy
prescribed plainly suggest, was intended for the protection of the
public against the evils which were supposed to flow from the undue
lessening of competition. . . . Mere acquisition by one corporation
of the stock of a competitor, even though it result in some lessening
of competition, is not forbidden; the act deals only with such acqui-
sitions as probably will result in lessening competition to a substantial
degree, . . . that is to say, to such a degree as will injuriously affect
the public. 50
The Court further reasoned that since the poor financial condition of
McElwain at the time of acquisition would have ultimately resulted in
insolvency, the prospect of future competition was virtually eliminated.
Thus, no prejudice could possibly accrue to the public interest.
The clear import of International Shoe is that, although two firms
may be in substantial competition prior to acquisition, such acquisition
will not result in a Section 7 violation unless their combined trade involves
a share of the market sufficient to render an adverse effect on the public
interest probable. This "public interest" doctrine was followed by the
lower courts in subse'quent Section 7 decisions.5 1
48. Although the FTC was successful in obtaining an order for Alcoa to divest
itself of the stock acquired in the new firm, the new firm became insolvent and Alcoa
bought the physical property of the firm at a sheriff's sale after obtaining a court
ruling that the debt owed Alcoa by the new firm was bona fide. FTC v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 299 Fed. 361 (3d Cir. 1924).
49. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). International, the
largest shoe manufacturer in the country, acquired the stock of McElwain Shoe Com-
pany, the largest firm in the industry, which at the time of the acquisition was in
serious financial difficulty. International's sales were primarily in the smaller towns
and cities where their less expensive but more durable shoes had particular appeal.
McElwain, on the other hand, made more expensive dress-type shoes which it gen-
erally sold in the larger cities. It was found that less than 5 percent of each com-
pany's products were sold in competitive markets. The Court held that this did not
constitute "substantial competition" within the meaning of the qualifying clause.
50. Id. at 297-98. The Supreme Court thus adopted the Sherman Act "rule of
reason" into Section 7 contrary to the earlier holdings in Alcoa and Standard Fashion.
51. V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Temple Anthracite
Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1931) ; United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
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2. "to restrain commerce in any section or community"
Prior to the 1950 amendment no case upheld a violation of Section 7
solely under the restraint phrase. However, it would be useful to analyze
certain Clayton Act cases which have held that domination of the market
could sufficiently restrain commerce so as to result in injury to the public.
In the early case of United States v. New England Fish Exchange,
52
prosecuted by the Justice Department, stock acquisitions giving the
acquiring firms control of all thirty-three dealers on the Fish Pier in
Boston were held to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act as well as
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. At that time the Fish Pier handled
75 percent of the interstate trade in fresh ground fish.
Further evidence that the courts will apply the domination of the
market test without finding a specific intent to monopolize is found in the
Columbia Steel decision of 1948.53 Although this was a Sherman Act
proceeding, the Court, in testing for domination of the market, held
that (1) it was first necessary to delineate the market in which the firms
competed and then determine the extent of their competition in that
market; (2) dollar volume alone is not controlling, but must be con-
sidered in conjunction with (a) the percentage of business controlled, (b)
the strength of the remaining competitors, (c) whether the transaction
results from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, (d) the
probable development of the industry, (e) consumer demands, (f) other
characteristics of the market; (3) because the relative effect of percentage
command of a market varies in different markets, no minimum figures
could be adopted to measure the reasonableness of a firm's purchase of the
assets of a competitor.
The case of Standard Oil v. United States,54 represented the Justice
Department's most recent attempt to apply the Sherman Act to vertical
mergers prior to the 1950 Amendment and its lack of success is generally
considered to have precipitated the Amendment. In this Section 3 case,
the Supreme Court distinguished between situations where "substantiality"
must be proved and those in which it may be inferred. The Court held
52. 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919). See also the Standard Fashion case where
tying agreements of. a pattern manufacturer who controlled 40 percent of the national
market and had a virtual monopoly in many cities were invalidated. Other Clayton
Act cases where domination of the market was a decisive factor include Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), where Guild controlled
60 percent of the women's dress market; International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), where IBM produced 81 percent of the tabulat-
ing cards sold; United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922),
where United controlled 95 percent of the shoe machinery in the nation.
53. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). U.S. Steel had
acquired the assets of Consolidated Steel, the largest fabricator on the west coast.
The Court held the exclusion of competitors from supplying Consolidated Steel's
requirements was reasonable after a finding that it produced only 3 percent of the
total demand in the relevant market. The resulting decrease in competition between
the two firms was held proper when shown that the products of the firms were
widely different.
54. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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that competition had been or would be substantially lessened by require-
ments contracts with independent gas retailers in a seven state area in-
volving $58,000,000 in sales in 1947, even though such sales comprised
only 6.7 percent of the total in that area. It is clear that the Court
abandoned the Sherman Act test as a measure of Section 3 violations and
ruled that once the transaction is found to affect a substantial market
share, further proof that competition has, or probably will be, diminished
is not required. This "quantitative substantiality" test became an integral
part of the new Section 7 in applying the "substantiality" phrase.
3. "tend to create a monopoly"
Great difficulty arises in determining whether this has any separate
meaning. For it must necessarily follow that if there is a violation of
the first qualifying phrase, i.e., a substantial lessening of competition,
there must also be a violation of the third qualifying phrase, since any
acquisition which substantially lessens competition must also tend to
create a monopoly. Indeed, the Alcoa case, discussed supra, may be cited
as the only Section 7 decision which relied solely on this particular quali-
fying phrase. In that case there had been no competition whatsoever
between the two companies prior to the merger, and the decision was
predicated solely upon a violation of the monopoly provision. This dis-
tinction was soon lost, however, when later cases applied the "substanti-
ality" test to competition in the industry as a whole rather than between
two firms. As a result, the "monopoly" and "substantially lessen" phrases
are not to be considered as separate and distinct tests but rather should
be viewed as counterparts.
C. The Legislative Loophole
As noted in the legislative history, Section 7 was not directed at the
acquisition of assets. The possibility of asset acquisition was discussed,
but was not deemed important to an Act directed primarily at the develop-
ment of holding companies and at the secret acquisition of competitors
through the purchase of such competitors' stock. This loophole was pri-
marily responsible for the judicial interpretations of Section 7 which
severely limited its effectiveness.
In 1926 the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in three cases
which had resulted in conflicting views in the lower courts as to the
authority of the FTC to order divestment by the acquiring firm of the
assets of the acquired firm.5 5 The Court, considering the cases jointly,
reversed the decisions of each of the three lower courts.56 Mr. Justice
McReynolds, speaking for the majority, distinguished between a situation
55. FTC v. Thatcher Manufacturing Co., 5 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1925) ; Swift & Co.
v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1925); Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 4 F.2d 223 (9th
Cir. 1925).
56. 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
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in which the Commission orders the acquiring firm to divest itself of stock,
including the physical assets of the acquired firm, and a situation in which
the transfer of the physical assets had already been completed prior to
the issuance of a complaint by the Commission. In the Western Meat case,
the acquiring firm had acquired the stock of the competitor and was
ordered to divest by the Commission. However, subsequent to the order,
Western Meat acquired the physical assets of the competitor. The Court
reversed the lower court, which had dissolved the injunction against
the acquisition of the assets of the competitor, and held that divestment
must be actual and complete. Nor could the stock that was ordered to be
divested be used to secure title to the physical property of the acquired
firm.
In the Swift and Thatcher cases, the acquiring firms had acquired
the stocks of the competitors i)n violation of Section 7. However prior to
the filing of the complaint by the FTC they had secured the transfer of
the physical assets of the competing firms. The Court resolved both cases
similarly, holding that the Commission was without power under Section
7 to order the divestment of the assets acquired by Swift and Thatcher
prior to the commencement of proceedings. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote
the dissenting opinion for the Swift and Thatcher decisions in which
Chief Justice Taft and Justices Holmes and Stone concurred. The dissent
argued that the purpose of Section 7 was not only "to prevent continued
holding of the stock and the peculiar evils incident thereto" as stated by
the majority but also "to prevent the peculiar evils resulting therefrom."5 7
Thus, if the acquiring firm received the physical assets after the complaint
was issued and the FTC could require a re-transfer of the assets, then
it should have similar power where the firm acquires the assets prior
to the issuance of a complaint. To support its argument, the dissent cited
Section 1158 of the Clayton Act which permits action by the Commission
whenever it "shall have reason to believe that any person is violating
or has violated any of the provisions" of the earlier sections. (Emphasis
added.)
The inherent logic of the dissenting opinion was to no avail. In the
wake of this decision many corporations used the time between the
Commission's preliminary inquiry and its issuance of a formal complaint
to acquire the physical assets of competitors whose stock they had
previously acquired in violation of Section 7.
The asset loophole was completely confirmed in Arrow-Hart & Hege-
man Electric Co. v. FTC.59 Previously the question had remained open
57. Id. at 563 (dissenting opinion).
58. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
59. 291 U.S. 587 (1934). In a rather complicated series of transactions, a holding
company was created and exchanged its stock for the stock of two competing com-
panies, the Arrow Electric Co. and the Hart and Hegeman Manufacturing Co., both
engaged in the manufacture of electrical wiring devices. Upon the issuance of a com-
plaint by the FTC, but before an order to cease and desist was issued, the holding
company assigned its acquired stocks to two newly-created holding companies, the
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as to whether the Commission had authority to order divestment of assets
if, after proceedings had begun but prior to the issuance of the order to
divest, the acquiring firm completed the merger and disposed of the stock.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld this evasion of the authority
of the Commission through the use of corporate dummies on the grounds
that the Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. (1) was not in existence
when the FTC began its action against the dissolved holding company,
(2) had never held any stock contrary to Section 7 and (3) could not
be compelled to divest itself of physical assets. The asset loophole together
with the International Shoe case thus nailed the lid on the coffin containing
the weary and abused Section 7. Offending corporations could now escape
Section 7 violations if they could perpetrate their adroit manipulations
with sufficient celerity.60
The high hopes originally entertained for Section 7 of the Clayton
Act foundered on the shoals of unsympathetic judicial interpretation.
Congress recognized that competition is a basic cornerstone of our nation
and that a monopolistic economy is incompatible with our concepts of
liberty and democracy. But in attempting to insure effective competition,
its faulty legislative draftsmanship seriously impaired the courts in in-
terpreting the language of the Clayton Act. It created a loophole wide
enough for the largest of corporate giants to pass through without danger
of being caught.
The battle-scarred Section 7 was thus badly in need of repair at a
time when a great tidal wave of corporate mergers during the post World
War II boom threatened to wash away the remaining sands of legislative
restraint on corporate activity. Failure of the Act to combat corporate
evasions through the devices of asset acquisitions and vertical mergers
relegated it to the status occupied by the Sherman Act in 1914 - limitedly





Congress began the search for a workable amendment to Section 7
in 1943, following the final recommendations of the Temporary National
Arrow Manufacturing Co. and the H and H Electric Co. In return the original
holding company received the shares of the new companies which were distributed
to its shareholders and by corporate action it was then dissolved. The shareholders
of the two new holding companies joined with the shareholders of the subsidiary manu-
facturing companies in approving a merger agreement whereby a new corporation,
Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co., was formed which took over in its own name
all of the assets formerly belonging to the manufacturing companies.
60. In United States v. Celanese Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), the court followed the Arrow-Hart decision. But in Board of Governors v.
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Economic Committee (TNEC). 61 Thereafter, sixteen bills, receiving
varying degrees of consideration were introduced in the 78th through
the 81st Congresses until finally the Celler-Kefauver Act was enacted
on December 29, 1950.
-62
In its search for a solution, Congress was confronted with testimony
and reports showing the extent and significance of corporate integrations
and economic concentration. Prior to World War II, one-tenth of one
per cent of the corporations in the United States owned 51% of the total
corporate assets, 63  much of this concentration being attributable to
corporate integrations.6 4 From 1940 through 1947 financial periodicals
reported 2450 corporate integrations which involved more than five billion
dollars in assets; 65 this represented more than 5% of the total assets of
manufacturing corporations as of 1943. Moreover, in excess of 50% of
the net capital assets in fifteen important industries was controlled by the
three largest companies in that field.60 Under these conditions competition
61. Prior to 1943, 21 bills to amend Section 7 had been introduced in Congress.
The 1950 Amendment grew directly from the final report in 1941 of the Temporary
National Economic Committee (TNEC) which recommended that Congress empower
the FTC to pass on the legality of proposed acquisitions, whether of stock or assets.
TNEC, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (1941).
For excellent studies in detail of the legislative history of the 1950 amending
of Section 7, see Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52
COLuM. L. Rxv. 766-81 (1952) ; MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 1, from 221-53.
62. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1952).
63. Hearings on H.R. 515 at 15 (Commissioner Freer of the Federal Trade Com-
mission). Other indications of the level of concentration are: 4% of all manufactur-
ing corporations made 84% of the net profits of all manufacturing corporations. Ibid.
Less than 1.5% of all industrial employers employ about 55% of all industrial workers.
Hearings on H.R. 2357 at 13. The twenty-five largest manufacturing corporations
owned 26.9% of the assets of all manufacturing corporations in 1948. NATIONAL CITY
BANK OF NEW YORK, MONTHLY LETTER 69-70 (June 1949), reprinted in S. Hearings
on H.R. 2734 at 227.
64. The FTC found that 25% of the growth of major steel producers was through
external expansion rather than the construction of new facilities. The findings for
individual firms were: Bethlehem 33%, Republic 66%, Jones & Laughlin 17%,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube 25%, American Rolling Mill 20%, Inland 10%, Colorado
Fuel & Iron 40%, U.S. Steel 7%. FTC, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY
REPORT 25, 28 (1948).
65. Id. at 7. This figure covers mining and manufacturing industries alone.
Undoubtedly a greater number of acquisitions actually took place, since small trans-
actions are often not reported in the financial manuals.
Although during the period 1940-47 approximately 300,000 new firms entered
the mining and manufacturing industries, MEMORANDUM Oi THE COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF NEw YORK, reprinted in S. Hearings on H.R. 2734 at 55,
the importance of the 2450 reported acquisitions is undiminished. The new firms were
for the most part very small, H. Hearings on H.R. 2734 at 113, while the acquired
firms were of substantial size.
66. Percent of net capital assets owned by the three largest companies in the
industry. REPORT OF THE FTC ON THE CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTIVE FACILITIES
21 (1947).
Industry Industry
Aluminum .................... 100 Office, store machines and devices 70
Tin cans and other tinware ..... 95 Motor vehicles ................. 69
Linoleum .................... 92 Biscuits, crackers and pretzels... 68
Copper smelting and refining... 89 Agricultural machinery ......... 67
Cigarettes .................... 78 M eat products ................. 64
Distilled liquors .............. 72 Glass ......................... 57
Plumbing equipment and supplies 71 Dairy products ................ 56
Rubber tires and tubes ......... 70
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could easily be seriously impeded and its benefits denied to the public
even in the absence of agreement.
To combat these evils bills falling into three categories were intro-
duced into Congress between 1943 and 1949, having as their object the
amendment of Clayton 7. The first group of proposals followed the recom-
mendations of the TNEC, which would have required the prior approval
of stock or asset acquisitions where the corporations involved were larger
than some specified absolute size. Those falling into the second category
were designed to include asset acquisitions in the prohibitions of the
statute under a standard of illegality identical with that of the original
Clayton Act. The third grouping was comprised of proposals such as
the one finally adopted advocating the prohibition of assets as well as stock
acquisitions, but with a more restrictive standard of illegality.
67
Illustrative of the first category is a bill (H.R. 4810) introduced by
Representative Kefauver in the House in 1945 which was unanimously
approved by the House Committee on the Judiciary after being twice
amended.6s It provided that the prior approval of an acquisition of
stock or assets by a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC
had to be obtained from that commission if the acquisition would have
unified the control of corporations, the sales of which had aggregated
during the previous calendar year as much as 5% of the total sales
in their lines of commerce.6 9 The bill stated that the FTC should not
approve an acquisition unless it found:
(a) that the acquisition will not substantially lessen competition,
restrain trade, or tend to create a monopoly (either in a single
section of the country or in the country as a whole) in the trade,
industry or line of commerce in which such corporations are engaged;
(b) that the size of the acquiring corporation after the acquisition
will be compatible with the existence and maintenance of effective
competition in the trade, industry, or line of commerce in which it
is engaged;
(c) that the acquisition will not so reduce the number of com-
peting companies in the trade, industry, or line of commerce affected
as materially to lessen the effectiveness of competition therein;
(d) that the acquiring corporation has not, to induce the acqui-
sition or to eliminate the competition of the corporation sought to be
acquired, indulged in unfair methods of competition in violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.
7 0
The committee report was not indicative of an intent to effectuate a
change in the Act's standard of illegality. Rather, the committee was
attempting to utilize a prior approval provision apparently designed to
67. MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 222.
68. Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act, U.S. House Committee on
the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rep. 1480 (1946).
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 7.
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avoid the problems involved in dissolving an already accomplished merger.
The House Rules Committee refused the bill a rule, and therefore the
House as a whole never considered it, although it was later discovered
that the Rules Committee objected only to the prior approval provision.71
The Committee then recalled Representative Kefauver's bill in an effort
to allow consideration of some amendment of Section 7 and reported
unanimously a new version (H.R. 5535) which omitted the prior approval
provision.7 2 However, despite removal of this provision, the bill was
again refused a rule, and it died with the 79th Congress. Similar bills
introduced in the 80th and 81st Congresses were likewise rejected.
Then, in the initial session of the 81st Congress, Representatives
Jackson, Hobbs, and Celler each introduced bills providing for the pro-
hibition of asset acquisitions under a standard of illegality, stipulating the
test to be the "lessening of competition," but omitting the acquiring-
acquired test previously proposed.73 The identical bill was introduced in
the Senate jointly by Senators Kefauver and O'Mahoney.74
Following hearings by a subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 75 the full committee reported H.R. 2734 favorably, on August
4, 1949.70 Representative Celler by-passed the Rules Committee by having
the bill debated in the House under suspension of the rules, even though
this procedure required a two-thirds majority for passage. The House
passed the bill without amendment on August 15, 1949, by a vote of 223 to
92, with 117 abstentions. 77
No hearings were held in the Senate on the bill introduced by
Senators Kefauver and O'Mahoney. However, in September, 1949, and
February, 1950, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee held hearings on the ap-
proved version of H.R. 2734.78 On June 2, 1950, the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary reported the bill favorably with Senator Donnell pre-
senting minority views. 79 Only minor alterations were recommended by
71. Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act, Hearings on H.R. 515, U.S.
Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1945).
72. Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act, U.S. House Committee on
the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Report 1820 (1946). (This stamped the bill
as illustrative of the second category, i.e., H.R. 5535 would have prohibited asset
acquisitions under the same conditions as those under which stock acquisitions were
prohibited in the original Section 7.
73. U.S. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 988, H.R. 2006, and H.R. 2734. The "acquir-
ing-acquired" provision applied the test of lessening of competition specifically as
between the merging concerns. This provision was strongly objected to by many on
the grounds that it would make practically all asset provisions illegal, even though
they might have the effect of increasing competition in the lines of commerce in which
the corporations were engaged. See Hearings on H.R. 515, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
(1945).
74. U.S. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., S. 56 (1949).
75. Hearings on H.R. 988, H.R. 1240, H.R. 2006, H.R. 2734.
76. Amending an Act Approved October 15, 1914, U.S. House Committee on the
Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., H. Report 1191 (1949).
77. 95 CONG. Rtc. 11484-507 (1949).
78. Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, Hearings on H.R. 2734, U.S. Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1950).
79. Amending an Act Approved October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730), U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., S. Report 1775 (1950).
NOTE
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/14
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the Committee, and the Senate passed the bill on December 13, 1950, by
a 55 to 22 vote, with 19 not voting. 0 It was approved by President
Truman sixteen days later.8 '
B. Substantive Changes in Section 7
The most important substantive revisions in the 1950 amendment
were the changes in the wording of the first two paragraphs of Section 7.
The following is the enacted Celler Amendment. Any words deleted
from the original Section 7 are in brackets, while those added have been
italicized.
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be [to] substantially to lessen competition [between the corpora-
tion whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the
acquisition or to restrain such commerce in any section or com-
munity,] or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of commerce].
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire
the whole or any part of the assets of [two] one or more corporations
engaged in commerce; where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets,
or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies
or otherwise, may be [to] substantially to lessen competition [between
such corporations, or any of them, whose stock or other share
capital is so acquired, or to restrain such commerce in any section
or community], or to tend to create a monopoly [of any line of com-
merce] .82
The heart of the amendment lies in the addition of the words "the
whole or any part of the assets," which purports to place asset acquisition
on the same footing as stock acquisition, and thereby plug the loophole
which had allowed circumvention of the original section 7. While "assets"
is undoubtedly the key word, it was nowhere defined in the amendment.
The TNEC in 1941 had recommended a prohibition of the acquisition
of assets and property of competing corporations over a certain size,
unless the Commission found that the acquisition would benefit the
public interest, adding: "The, authority given would, of course, relate
to capital assets of competitors and not to inventory or stock in trade. '83
An earlier bill to amend Section 7 likewise excluded inventories from the
80. 96 CoNc. Ric. 16573 (1950).
81. Id. at 17138.
82. 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914), and 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
83. Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic
Committee, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10564, 38 (1941).
[VOL. 10
21
Editors: The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SUMMER 1965]
definition of "assets. 's 4 However, the failure to expressly exclude the
term "inventories" from the meaning of "assets" in the Celler Act may
be construed as a purposeful act of inclusion by Congress, consistent
with its general tenor in passing the bill. 5 It is probable that Congress
contemplated a definition in harmony with the qualifying phrase of the
section, "substantially to lessen competition," finding that an acquisition
of "assets" has occurred where such purpose may have the effect of sub-
stantially abating competition. Certainly, it is more plausible that "assets"
was used to fill a gap caused by its absence than to distinguish between
types of assets.
A second major change was the elimination of the intercorporate or
acquiring-acquired test, effected by deletion of the words "between the cor-
poration whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisi-
tion." These words, in the context of the original Section 7, appeared to
outlaw every merger where the corporations involved were engaged in any
significant competition whatever, since a merger would not merely lessen
intercorporate competition, but would eliminate it entirely. In practice, how-
ever, the test had been read out of the Act by requiring the competition
between the corporations to be substantial and by accepting the Sherman
Act standard of diminution of competition in the industry as a whole.8 6
Conversely, the abandonment of the acquiring-acquired clause has extended
the coverage of the section into a heretofore exempted area. Generally, the
belief had been that Section 7 applied only to horizontal combinations, not
vertical or conglomerate acquisitions. But explicit legislative declarations
have made it plain that the section as amended is intended to apply to all
types of mergers and acquisitions.
87
The final major change effected in Section 7 sprang from the addition
of the phrase "in any line of commerce in any section of the country." This
phrase acts on both the lessening of competition and tendency toward
monopoly tests of Section 7. "Section of the country" replaced "com-
munity," which acted only on the restraint of commerce test. Though "sec-
tion of the country" may seem to imply a geographical area, the ultimate
Congressional intent appears to refer to a trade area or area of effective
competition.88 The industry-wide test of the old Section 7 was abandoned
along with the theory that the lessening of competition had to take place
in the area of competition of the acquiring or the acquired corporation.8 9
84. H.R. 1240, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
85. This conclusion is supported by the Senate Judiciary Committee's refusal
to heed a request made by letter from a lobbying group that inventories or stock in
trade be excluded from the term "assets." S. Rim. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
313-15 (1950).
86. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee of the Judiciary on
H.R. 515, 80th Cong., l'st Sess. 258 (1947). See, e.g., V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54
F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931).
87. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
88. This reasoning is supported by testimony in Hearings before the Subcommittee
of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, on H.R. 2734, 81st Cong.,
1st and 2d Sess. 3852 passim., 66-84 passim., 101-02, 132, 133, 144, 145 (1950).
89. S. R4P. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
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"In any line of commerce," an apparently straight forward phrase,
was intended by Congress to have an extremely significant effect. Com-
menting on it, the Senate report said: "It is intended that acquisitions
which substantially lessen competition, as well as those which tend to
create a monopoly, will be unlawful if they have the specified effect in any
line of commerce, whether or not that line of commerce is a large part of
the business of any of the corporations involved in the acquisition.90
(Emphasis added.)
If judicially recognized, this statement of Congressional intent could
be most important in establishing a meaningful economic criterion. It
would be impossible for a merger having a substantial detrimental effect in
some particular market to escape condemnation on the theory that the
share of the market foreclosed is insignificant when contrasted with the
size and variety of the corporation's total activities.
At any rate, in proceedings under amended Section 7, delineation of
the "line of commerce" and "section of the country" has become a threshold
question and a necessary prelude to any finding of violation, since anti-
competitive effects can be measured only within a specified trade area.
It should be clear that the Celler Anti-Merger Act accomplished more
than the inclusion of assets within the prohibition of the statute. Amended
Section 7 can be used to curtail the growth of a small corporation which
attempts to attain monopolistic proportions through the acquisition of a
number of small corporations in an industry where small corporations
predominate. The omission of the acquiring-acquired test of competition
has at the same time extended Section 7 to apply to vertical and con-
glomerate mergers. The Celler Act test of a substantial lessening of com-
petition is more easily satisfied than the Sherman Act test of lessening
of competition in an entire industry. Furthermore, the probable lessening
of competition may be demonstrated in any section of the country, rather
than in the nation as a whole, and may occur in a line of commerce
which is not the principal business of the combining corporations. Thus
was the Clayton Act reinforced; all that remained was the critical test
of judicial interpretation.
C. Judicial Interpretation
The 1950 amendment was designed to strengthen the law concerning
mergers and acquisitions. Yet paradoxically, the number of mergers and
acquisitions increased steadily during the five years following its enact-
ment.91 It is estimated that more than five hundred corporate mergers and
acquisitions in manufacturing and mining activities took place in 1955, a
record number for any year since the feverish merger activity of the 20's.
For the 1951-1955 period as a whole, the total number was substantially
higher than for any other five-year period in the last quarter century.
92
90. Ibid.
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Apparently, amended Section 7 did not of itself inhibit those business
concerns having merger inclinations. However, judicial interpretation in
the following years demonstrated that the amended Section 7 was no
mere "paper tiger."
Interpretation of amended Section 7 both by the courts and the FTC
has been anything but consistent. The decisions have clearly indicated that
no mechanical quantitative or qualitative test can be deduced or is indeed
desirable, and that any attempt to extract a set of precisely weighted
factors therefrom is doomed to failure. An analysis of the course of judicial
interpretation of the section, from its passage until the Brown case93 in
1962, illustrates that the courts and the FTC have varied greatly, not only
in listing the relevant factors, but also in evaluating their significance.
1. Degree of Concentration in the Industry
The factor which has received the foremost consideration by the
tribunals is the degree of concentration resulting from the acquisition in
the market involved.9 4 Section 7 does not use the word "concentration"
nor does it prohibit an increase in concentration as such. Where, however,
an undue increase in concentration has been found, coupled with a determi-
nation of probable effect on market performance, the acquisition has been
found to be detrimental to competition. 5 It is probable that, in formulating
this conclusion, the cases have drawn liberally from the legislative history
of the Act which everywhere reflects Congressional concern with un-
due concentration.96
The answer to the question whether concentration has increased
excessively will depend on the number of firms used as a measuring rod.
The Bethlehem Steel case9 7 held that in a concentrated market where
competitors are few, a substantial increase in concentration is violative of
Section 7. Had the merger been consummated, "[i] nstead of 12 producers
controlling 83% of total industry capacity there would be only 11; instead
of the Big 2 controlling 45% as against the present 10 with their 38%,
they would control 50%. . . ."98 Therefore, in the industry's framework,
the merger rendered the possibility of effective competition from the rivals
of the Big Two remote.
To the same effect is the Erie case9 9 where a merger which would
have resulted in a combination of 86.8% of all the lake sand sold was found
93. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Thorough treatments
of post-1950 Section 7 case law may be found in 36 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1076 (1961) and
48 VA. L. Rv. 827 (1962).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F.
Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
95. Ibid.
96. See, e.g., S. RlP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950) ; H.R. R4P. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
97. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
98. Id. at 607.
99. Erie Sand & Gravel Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 28358 (FTC Order Oct. 26,
1959), remanded for redetermination, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
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to violate Section 7.100 And in the Brillo Manufacturing Company case, 10 1
the court held that where an oligopoly existed, even the smallest increase
in concentration would contravene the Act.10 2
On the other hand, where competitors are many, more must be shown
in order to justify a holding of illegality. In E. L. Bruce Co. v. Empire
Millwork Corp.,103 the court denied a preliminary injunction to restrain
one major distributor of hardwood flooring from acquiring a majority stock
interest in another. The plaintiff was alleged to be the industry leader, with
an 8% share of the national market, and defendant's subsidiary held a 5%
share. The court noted that there were some 170 concerns in the industry;
that they competed vigorously; and that there was insufficient evidence of
any reasonable probability that competition would be substantially lessened.
A third category of cases has as its peculiar characteristic a restricted
geographic, competitive market area where almost any contemplated merger
would unduly reduce competition and produce market dominance. In
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 0 4 where the court
held invalid an attempted absorption of the business of the largest inde-
pendent dealer by the leading wholesaler in the area, as combining the
affairs of the two concerns into a single operation, would have the effect
of augmenting the influence of the latter and ridding the former of a
troublesome rival.
In the Crown Zellerbach case, 105 the Commission ruled that a merger
of the foremost competitors in the relevant "3 state area" market, whose
combined production accounted for 62.5% of the western production, was
illegal, emphasizing that one immediate result of the acquisition was to
remove from the western supplies market "an important, fully integrated
competitor" and to increase significantly the size of the respondent in the
relevant line of commerce "in which it already had a commanding lead."' 0 6
Ultimately, the court relied on "the tendency to concentration of power"' 07
to strike down the merger; it concluded that the acquisition of a rival firm
by a larger one which resulted in a substantial increase in the concentra-
tion of power in the absorbing concern is to be prohibited. 08 The court,
100. The Third Circuit remanded the matter to the FTC for a redetermination
because the FTC failed to consider the proper factors in defining relevant market areas.
101. Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 28667 (FTC Order March 25, 1960).
On February 28, 1962, the hearing examiner issued a third initial decision in the
Brillo case, holding Brillo's acquisition of Williams Company violative of Section 7.
Brillo Mfg. Co., Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ff 15772 (FTC Order Feb. 28, 1962).
102. Prior to Brillo's acquisition of the Williams Company, Brillo's share of the
market was 45.3% and Williams' 0.3%. S.O.S., the largest company, had 50.9%.
Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ir 28667, 37338 (FTC Order March 25, 1960).
To the same effect, see Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.),
aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960).
103. 164 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
104. 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
105. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 26923 (FTC Order Dec. 26,
1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
106. rd. at 835.
107. Id. at 827-28.
108. Id. at 836.
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along with the FTC's decision in the Foremost Dairies case, 0 9 seemed to
be going astray in reviving the discredited quantitative test and tending
toward the fallacious concept that size alone determines the result.
2. Market Share - Dollar and Volume Considerations
Almost any decision under Section 7 of the Clayton Act deals with the
market share of the acquiring and acquired companies. If the concentra-
tion in the industry is initially high, even the most minute acquisition will
likely be challenged." 0 However, standing alone, market share is not
significant in determining the competitive consequences of a given acquisi-
tion. After weighing other competitive factors, the consequences will vary
with the nature of the market involved."'
Yet it is true that the higher the market share, the more likely it is
that competition will be affected by the acquisition; and the more closely
a market share approaches monopolistic proportions the fewer additional
facts are required for a determination of the competitive consequences. This
view was expressed in the secoid Brillo decision," 2 which reversed an
earlier opinion wherein the significance of market share, when viewed in
connection with heavy industry concentration, was totally ignored. And
the FTC's decision in Erie Sand & Gravel Co." 3 emphasized that where
the sales of the merged companies amounted to more than 80% of all like
sand sold in the relevant market, market dominance had clearly been
achieved. In addition, the merged complex had become the only major
supplier in several cities.
In the context of a static industry the tribunals have not been loath
to find the requisite competitive harm where high-ranking companies are
involved, even though the combined market share does not exceed 20%.
Thus, in the Bethlehem case" 4 the combination between the second and
sixth ranking producers increased defendant's share of the market from
16.2% to 20.9%. Pillsbury Mills, Inc.," 5 dealt with a combination between
the third and fifth ranking producers of family flour in the Southeast,
moving the acquiring company to first rank regionally with a market share
of 8.3%. The American Crystal Sugar case," 6 involving a merger of
109. Foremost Dairies, Inc., No. 6495, FTC, April 30, 1962.
110. See, e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F.
Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
111. For example, in the first Brillo case [Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep.
1 27243 (FTC Order 1958) at 36624], the FTC emphasized that "in addition to the
facts concerning market shares, likewise important" is evidence pertaining to the
"'general competitive situation, number of competitors, and degree of concentration
in the industry."
112. Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 28667 (FTC Order March 25, 1960).
For subsequent history, see supra note 41.
113. Trade Reg. Rep. [ 28358 (FTC Order Oct. 26, 1959), remanded for re-
determination, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
114. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
115. Trade Reg. Rep. r 29277 (FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960).
116. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp.
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
NOTE
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol10/iss4/14
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the eighth and eleventh ranking producers of refined sugar nationally,
resulted in the acquiring company's moving to fourth rank nationally and
increasing its market share to 13% in the regional market.
3. Ease of Entry into the Relevant Industry
Ease of entry has been considered one of the most revealing indicia of
competitive soundness."17 Thus, where the facts have shown, as in United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,"" that the industry was dynamically
expanding and entry was relatively easy, the merger has been upheld.
However, a finding that an industry is static, or ease of entry difficult,
has led the courts to conclude that increased concentration ordinarily
results in adverse competitive effects. Indicative of this rationale is the
opinion of the lower court in the American Crystal Sugar case 19 where
a trend towards concentration was predicated on the lack of new firms
for thirty years, a quota system serving to bar new entry, the positive signs
of deterioration of market structure conditions, and the recent acquisitions
of several refineries by competitors. A like conclusion was reached as
regards the iron and steel industry. 20 And in the second Brillo decision
it was stated that with respect to industrial steel wool that low profit
margins, excess capacity, and a relatively static market constituted handi-
caps to profitable operations by existing smaller companies and imposed a
formidable barrier to the success of new entries into the field.' 2 1
Even where the entrance of new competitors has been shown, at least
one case has required a further showing that the entrants would effectively
replace the competition previously afforded by the acquired company.' 2 2
4. Countervailing Power
The argument has been advanced that where a few outstanding com-
panies set the pattern of competition in an industry, a merger of smaller
companies might produce more effective competition. While this would
117. As-the ATTr'y GEN. NAT'S COMM. ANTITRUST RxP. (1955), states at 327:
"New firms entering an industry may not all survive. Some may be weeded out in
the competitive struggle, sometimes indeed after making their contribution either to
pricing or to business methods. But reasonable opportunity for entry is needed if
there is to be an assurance of a sufficient number of sellers to maintain effective
competition and thus prevent markets from evolving gradually into a state of
monopolistic stability."
118. 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Compare Scott Paper Co., Trade Reg.
Rep. 1 29278 (FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960), remanded for taking of further evidence,
301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962).
119. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
120. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 606 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
121. See Brillo Mfg. Co., Trade Reg. Rep. f 28667 (FTC Order March 25, 1960),
at 37336-37.
122. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 26923 (FTC Order Dec. 26,
1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), which decision overthrew the merger after
concluding that the new entrants were no competitive threat for sales to jobbers and
converters, nor was there any indication that any new supplier would offer Crown the
form of stiff competition provided by St. Helens.
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augment the concentration in the industry, the net effect might well be to
stimulate competition, rather than abate it. In addition, if mergers be-
tween smaller companies are not permitted, they may not be able to
compete with each other, let alone with the larger concerns.
Efforts to set up this theory in defense of a challenged acquisition have
met with a singular lack of success. 12 3 In rejecting this thesis, one court
has reasoned that "to the extent that a reduction in the number of significant
firms in an industry reduces the incentive to reap a short term advantage
by independent action, economic analysis indicates that increased concen-
tration is detrimental to competition.'
124
5. Elimination of a Substantial Competitor
Another factor much relied upon by the courts in evaluating competi-
tive effects is whether the merger results in the elimination of an enterprise
which has been a substantial competitive factor. Where such has occurred,
the courts have almost universally held the merger violative of Section 7,
regardless of whether the merger be horizontal or vertical. 125
6. Restrictions on Supply Outlets and Competitive
Opportunities in the Market for Others
In vertical mergers, restricting or foreclosing sources of supply or
outlets in the market generally is deemed the most important factor. The
legality of such a transaction is tested by the existence of a reasonable
probability that it will eliminate competition from a substantial share of the
market either by (a) foreclosing a substantial source of supply, or (b)
limiting significantly the competitive opportunities of others trading in
the market involved.
Every merger of a supplier corporation with a customer results in the
supplier's competitors being automatically foreclosed from the customer's
trade. But such a merger should be free from legal sanction if the supplier
sells only to the acquiring company, and if alternative sources of supply are
available to the acquiring company's competitors. Nor should it matter
that the customer buys only from the acquiring company, since the com-
peting seller is not thereby deprived of a market for his goods. The
sanction of Section 7 should be invoked only where vertical acquisition
leaves competitors without needed supplies or channels of distribution.
123. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F.2d
387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
124. American Crystal' Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
125. Decisions involving horizontal mergers in accord: United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
1 29277 (FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960). Decisions involving vertical mergers in accord:
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C..
1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960) ; A. G. Spalding & Bros., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 28694
(FTC Order March 30, 1960), aff'd, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
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To this effect have been the decisions in Crown Zellerbach,126
Bethlehem Steel,127 Jerrold Electronics,128 and Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers.129 The Reynolds'30 case has a noteworthy variation; there
the requisite anticompetitive effect was found in the vertical line between
the acquired company and its competitors, rather than in the foreclosure
of competitors from sources of supply or outlets. The rationale of the de-
cision is that an acquisition by a comparatively wealthy corporation violates
Section 7 if that company's financial resources enable it to sell below cost,
thereby injuring competition. A later case' 8 ' found this to be violative of
Section 7 only when such resources are utilized to injure competition.
8 2
The DuPont-General Motors decision stands alone in defiance of this
prevailing doctrine. 83  There the Court held that in considering the com-
petitive impact of a vertical acquisition, only the "quantitative substantiality"
doctrine need be applied. 34 However, neither the courts nor the FTC has
since been inclined to blindly adopt the concept that foreclosure must be
presumed where the business of the acquired supplier or customer accounts
for a substantial percentage of the total market.
7. Miscellaneous Factors
The various tribunals have considered numerous other miscellaneous
factors. Among the more recurring are the history of prior acquisitions, 3 5
post-acquisition facts, 86 and the expectations of the acquiring company.'
3 7
126. Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 26923 (FTC Order Dec. 26,
1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
127. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
128. United States v. Jerrold Electronic Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961), where the court allowed the defendant to keep its
past acquisitions but enjoined future acquisitions for three years.
129. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
130. Reynolds Metals Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 28533 (FTC Order Jan. 21, 1960),
aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
131. Union Carbide Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 15503 (FTC Order Sept. 25, 1961).
132. In affirming the dismissal by the hearing examiner, the Commission described
its position as follows:
This aspect of the acquisition is purely conglomerate and the worst thing
that can be said of it is that the Visking cellulose sausage casings now have the
backing of Union Carbide's one and one-half billion dollars instead of Visking's
thirty-eight million. This showing alone will not support a finding that a lessen-
ing of competition is the probable result of Union Carbide's emergence as a sausage
casing seller. Such an unfavorable prognosis must be based upon more solid
ground. Id. at 20374.
133. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
134. Id. at 595. The Court maintained that in order to establish a violation of
Section 7, two requirements of proof must be satisfied: (1) the market affected must
be substantial, and (2) there must be a likelihood that competition may be foreclosed
in a substantial share of that market.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 26923 (FTC Order Dec. 26, 1957),
aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. 11 29277
(FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960).
136. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957) ; Procter & Gamble Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 15245 (FTC Order June 15, 1961).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F.
Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
[VOL. 10
29
Editors: The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SUMMER 1965]
At least one case has considered as decisive, in a close factual situation, the
aggressiveness of management and the solidarity of market position.
138
A number of interesting observations can be culled from the amended
Section 7 cases. Among them are: (a) The FTC has shown a willingness
to intervene in situations which might be considered essentially local and
as having little national importance,13 9 thereby employing to the utmost the
vital new concept of "any section of the country." (b) In the determina-
tion of the relevant "line of commerce," the tests of "reasonable interchange-
ability"'140 and "peculiar characteristics and uses"'14 which the courts pur-
port to distinguish 14 2 are merely verbal variants of the same fundamental
doctrine. If products can be used interchangeably, their individual uses
or characteristics cannot be termed "peculiar" to themselves. On the other
hand, if they cannot be reasonably interchanged, they must of necessity
possess peculiar characteristics and uses. Of course, the terms may be dis-
tinguished by judicial manipulation of the word "reasonable," a term which
lends itself to differing constructions. (c) The argument of "potential com-
petition,' 43 much invoked by harried defendants, has been treated with a
total lack of sympathy, the tribunals displaying a tendency to apply it when it
would facilitate finding a violation of Section 7, and a corresponding un-
willingness to invoke it where its use would dictate a contrary result.
44
A reading of the cases cited in the preceding sections makes it clear
that no one of the above-discussed factors is controlling or decisive. Rather,
it is the presence of some, the absence of others, and the interrelationship
of those found to exist which will be decisive of the litigation. The same
reading should be sufficient to convince one that there is no set formula or
easy test to determine whether or not Section 7 should be invoked. Any
138. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 29277 (FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960).
139. See, e.g., Reynolds Metal Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 28533 (FTC Order Jan.
21, 1960), affd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Erie Sand & Gravel Co., Trade Reg.
Rep. 11 283558 (FTC Order Oct. 26, 1959), remanded for redetermination, 291 F.2d 279
(3d Cir. 1961).
140. Found in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956), at 404: "The 'market' which one must study to determine when a producer
has monopoly power will vary with the part of commerce under consideration. The
tests are constant. That market is composed of products that have reasonable inter-
changeability for the purposes for which they are produced - price, use and
qualities considered."
141. Found in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1957) : "Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a
finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened monopoly must be one
which will substantially lessen competition 'within the area of effective competition.'
(Footnote omitted). Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market
affected. The record shows that automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficiently
peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct
from all other finishes and fabrics (footnote omitted) to make them a 'line of com-
merce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act."
142. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 183,
185 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
143. The argument can be stated as follows: A merger, though it may tend to
increase market concentration, is not within the scope of Section 7 because there is
other, as yet untapped, potential competition in the relevant market area.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 26923 (FTC Order
Dec. 26, 1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
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generalizations on this point must of necessity be tentative; the tribunals
had a mere twelve years to grapple with Section 7 prior to 1962, and
further revision and clarification has since taken place. 145 However, by the
early sixties, one might reasonably venture the conclusion that a merger
would be regarded as highly suspect when: (1) a substantial competitor is
acquired by a top-ranking firm in the same industry, or an acquisition
results in a total market share of about 15-20% in a context of a static
industry, in which future entry of new competitors is unlikely; or (2) in
cases of vertical acquisition where supplies are permanently foreclosed from
a substantial market, or others trading in the market are left without inde-
pendent sources of supply; or (3) where the acquisition disrupts the pattern
of pre-existing competition in the acquired company's market.146
Thus stood the judicial construction of amended Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act to June 25, 1962, on which date the Supreme Court, in a landmark
decision, 14 7 breathed further vitality into an already much revivified statute.
V.
BROWN SHOE: THE OMNIFIC OPINION*
A. The Economic Setting
Brown Shoe Company v. United States148 was the first case in
which the Supreme Court made a detailed analysis of the scope and
purposes of amended Section 7.149 The action was commenced in Novem-
ber 1955 when the Government filed a complaint seeking to restrain
consummation of a contemplated merger between the G. R. Kinney
Company, Inc. and the Brown Shoe Company, Inc. through an exchange
of Kinney stock for that of Brown.
In 1955, Brown was the fourth largest shoe manufacturer in the
country, producing about 4%150 of the Nation's total footwear production.
Kinney, also a manufacturer of shoes, produced 0.5%o of the national
shoe production in 1955, making it the twelfth largest shoe manufacturer
145. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co., Trade Reg. Rep. 1 29278 (FTC Order Dec. 16,
1960), remanded for taking of further evidence, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962) A G
Spalding & Bros., Trade Reg. Rep. ff 28694 (FTC Order March 30, 1960), a'd, 301
F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
146. See Rowe, Mergers and the Law: New Directions for the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J.
1074, 1076 (1961).
147. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
* Thomas J. Tumola, Edward J. O'Malley.
148. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950). Such an analysis was not necessary to the disposition
of the issues raised in Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362
U.S. 458 (1960), and Jerrold Electronics Corp. v..United States, 365 U.S. 567 (1961),
the only other amended Section 7 cases to come before the Supreme Court prior
to Brown Shoe.
150. This percentage represented an annual production of about 25.6 million pairs
of shoes, consisting of men's, women's and children's shoes.
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in the United States.151 Kinney, however, was principally engaged in
operating retail shoe stores. At the time of the trial it operated the
largest family-style shoe store chain in the United States. This chain
comprised over 400 such stores in over 270 cities which made 1.27 of
all national retail shoe sales by dollar volume, making Kinney the nation's
eighth largest retailer of shoes.15 2 Brown was also a leading retailer of
shoes. Through its ownership, operation or control of over 1,230 retail
outlets, 1 53 it was the third largest seller of shoes by dollar volume in
the United States.
The contemplated merger thus had both vertical and horizontal
aspects. In addition to the horizontal combination of Brown's manu-
facturing facilities and retail outlets with those of Kinney, there was a
vertical integration between Brown's manufacturing facilities and Kinney's
retail stores.
At the time of the merger, domestic shoe production was divided
among a large number of manufacturers; however, the top four manu-
facturers produced 23% of the Nation's shoes.' 5 4 Among shoe manu-
facturers there was a tendency to acquire retail outlets. Beginning in the
late 194 0's and the early 1950's, many shoe manufacturers had either
greatly increased their retail holdings or begun acquiring a substantial
number of retail outlets. Once the manufacturers acquired retail com-
panies, they supplied an increasing amount of the retail outlets' needs.
The district court found that the manufacturer-dominated stores were
foreclosing independent producers from previously available outlets.
Another industry trend was a decrease in the number of firms manufactur-
ing shoes - 10% in the eight years preceding the Broum case.
The development of Brown provides a striking illustration of this
merger trend. Prior to 1951, Brown had no retail outlets, but by 1956
had acquired 845 such outlets.155 The acquisition of these retailers led
to increased sales by Brown to the acquired companies. At the time of
the merger Kinney bought no shoes from Brown; however, by 1957
Brown had become the largest outside supplier'58 of Kinney's shoes,
supplying 7.9% of all Kinney's needs. It was conceded by Brown that
one of the reasons for the Kinney acquisition was to make Kinney's
market availabl to Brown.
151. Kinney owned and operated four plants which manufactured men's, women's
and children's shoes.
152. In 1955 the Kinney stores sold approximately 8 million pairs of shoes or
about 1.6% of the national pairage sales of shoes.
153. Of these 1,230 outlets, Brown owned and operated 470. While the balance
were independently owned, 570 of them operated under Brown's "Franchise Program"
by which they agreed to sell only Brown's shoes. The remaining 190 outlets agreed
to concentrate their purchases on Brown's line in return for certain aid from Brown.
Brown's shoes were also sold through many retailers operating independently of Brown.
154. The twenty-four largest manufacturers produced 35% of the Nation's shoes,
but the top four produced 65% of this production.
155. Since 1951, Brown also acquired seven companies engaged solely in shoe
manufacturing.
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B. The Relevant Market
In order to judge the probable effect of a given merger it is necessary
to dispose of the threshold question of delineating the relevant market.
For the extent to which competition will be lessened can only be de-
termined in terms of thei market affected.
Brown Shoe's criteria for determining the relevant product market
was formulated by incorporating the "peculiar characteristics and uses"
test with the "interchangeability of use" doctrine.1 57 The interchange-
ability of use doctrine, developed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,158
had its origin in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.'59
(the Cellophane case). There, the lines of the relevant product market
were said to depend on whether the commodities were reasonably inter-
changeable by consumers for the same purposes. "This interchange-
ability is largely gauged by the purchase of competing products for
similar uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability df the
competing commodities."'160 In the du Pont-General Motors case,161 the
peculiar characteristics and uses of the product were used to delineate
the relevant line of commerce. This test was used under the original
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and recognizes narrower sub-markets
within a broad product market. Under it the relevant question is whether
the particular product has such peculiar characteristics and uses as will
make it sufficiently distinct from all other similar products to constitute
a "line of commerce."
In Brown Shoe, the Court conceded that the outer boundaries of a
product market must be determined by "the reasonable interchangeability
of use or the cross elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it.1u 62 But, citing du Pont-General Motors, it added
a qualification to the interchangeability of use doctrine: "within the
broad market, well-defined sub-markets may exist which, in themselves,
constitute product markets for antitrust purposes."'1 63 (Emphasis added.)
The function of the concept of interchangeability of use was thereby
limited to a determination of the outer limits of a product market; but
within these outer limits distinct sub-markets may exist which must be
examined in determining whether a merger will "substantially lessen
competition" in "any line of commerce."
The boundaries of such a sub-market were to be determined by
examining such "practical indicia" as "industry or public recognition of
the sub-market as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar
157. See, 14 SYRACUSE L. Rev. 97, 99-100 (1962) ; Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,
309 F.2d 223, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
158. 26 Stat. 209 (1890) ; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).
159. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
160. Id. at 380-81.
161. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors."'1 4
Applying those considerations to the facts before it, the Court had little
trouble affirming the district court's finding that the relevant lines of
commerce were men's, women's and children's shoes. Each product
line was recognized by the public; was manufactured in separate plants;
had characteristics peculiar to itself rendering it non-competitive with
the other; and was directed toward a distinct class of consumers. 65
But even though the relevant lines of commerce were to be narrowly
drawn, the Court made it plain that the boundaries of the relevant market
had to be drawn "with sufficient breadth to include the competing products
of each of the merging companies and to recognize competition, where,
in fact competition exists."' 66 Applying this reasoning, the Court rejected
Brown's argument that the medium priced shoes it manufactured occupied
a product market different from the low priced shoes sold by Kinney.
Since "agreement with that argument would be equivalent to holding
that medium priced shoes do not compete with low priced shoes"'6 7 a
further division of product lines was deemed "unrealistic."
Prima facie, the "practical indicia" enumerated in Brown Shoe would
seem to form a logical basis for determining a line of commerce having
Section 7 significance. Such an approach, calling for full consideration
of all indications of inter-product competition, would seem to result in
the "well defined sub-markets" discussed in Brown Shoe. But such
a wide selection of practical indicia can give the government and the
courts an almost unlimited justification to pick and choose its own
product market. Furthermore, any possibility that the product market
will be drawn too narrowly is foreclosed by the Court's caveat that the
relevant market must be drawn with sufficient breadth to "recognize
competition where, in fact, competition exists." An examination of some
of the subsequent Section 7 cases applying Brown Shoe's approach for
delineating the product market points out the insufficiency of such criteria
in arriving at "well defined sub-markets."
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,16 8 the District of Columbia circuit
utilized the reasoning set forth in Brown Shoe in defining the relevant
product market. The case clearly illustrates the free hand that Brown
Shoe gave the courts in fitting a particular product within a particular
"line of commerce." Reynolds Metals Company, the world's largest pro-
ducer of aluminum foil, sought review of a Federal Trade Commission
164. Ibid. The indicia the Court listed reflect the reasons the Court used to
delineate the product market in previous decisions. See generally, BOCK, MERGERS AND
MARKETS, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 25-35 (1960).
165. The use of men's, women's and children's shoes as the relevant lines of com-
merce was held by the Court to be appropriate for considering the vertical as well as
the horizontal aspect of the merger, since the same considerations applied on the retail
level as applied on the manufacturing level.
166. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 162, at 326.
167. Ibid.
168. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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determination that Reynolds' 1956 acquisition of Arrow Brands, Inc., a
company engaged in converting aluminum foil and selling it to the whole-
sale florist trade, violated Section 7.169 Reynolds argued for a product
market that would include all decorative foil, that is not only florist foil,
but that sold for packaging food products as well. The FTC, on the other
hand, contended that the relevant line of commerce should be only the
production and sale of decorative aluminum foil to the florist trade.
The court agreed with Reynolds that florist foil did not have peculiar
characteristics and uses, since all decorative foil was gauged at approxi-
mately the same thickness. Nor were the decorative characteristics of foil
sent to florists distinguishable from foil decorated by similar color, lami-
nating or embossing but used, inter alia, as food wrapping. The court,
however, affirmed the commission's decision, holding that the evidence
otherwise indicated that florist foil should be treated as a distinct line
of commerce. First, there were distinct customers, the sole purchasers of
florist foil being wholesale and retail florists. Second, the industry recog-
nized the sub-market as a distinct economic entity. Other decorative foil
converters did not serve the florist industry, and the industry itself
purchased only from florist foil converters and not from other decorative
.foil converters. Nor did other users of decorative foil purchase the lower
priced florist foil. Finally, a definite price differential existed between
florist foil and other decorative foil. The evidence showed a much lower
price for florist foil as compared with the price of other colored or
embossed foil of comparable quality. °70 To the court, this price differential
effectively obviated inclusion in the same market, and had an "important
if not decisive bearing in the quest to determine the sub-market.''
Thus, in the Reynolds case, even though there were indications of
potential interchangeability between florist foil and other decorative foil,
the court nevertheless put the two products into separate lines of com-
merce. It would seem that the court should have accorded greater weight
to potential interchangeability even though there were factors present
showing an absence of actual interchangeability. Since a determination
169. Large foil producers such as Reynolds find it unprofitable to sell to small
buyers small quantities of foil to be used for specific and limited purposes such as the
decoration of flower pots or foodstuffs. As a result, Reynolds and other major raw
foil producers sell in quantity to intermediaries known as converters, who came into
existence to meet the needs of these small foil markets, which individually do not
require a sufficient amount of foil to purchase it in the minimum quantities sold by
the manufacturers. These converters purchase large quantities of foil from the pro-
ducers in "jumbo" rolls, and after breaking them down and processing them with
decorative features, they sell the processed foil to the several smaller markets. Arrow
Brands, Inc., prior to and subsequent to the merger was engaged in converting
"jumbo" rolls of foil into limited quantities which it then sold, in decorative form,
almost exclusively to the florist trade.
170. Florist foil costs only $.75 to $.85, per unit, while other colored or embossed
foil sold at prices ranging from $1.15 to $1.22 per unit.
171. Reynolds Metals Co. v. United States, supra note 168, at 229. The Court's
reasoning on this point was in effect, that since "prudent business men" do not pur-
chase the cheaper florist foil, it must be distinct from aluminum foil generally or else
the many users of the latter would have begun to purchase the former at the lower price.
768 [VOL. 10
35
Editors: The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SUMMER 1965]
must always be made as to the possible effects of a particular merger,172
it would seem crucial that more consideration be given to possible inter-
changeability in fixing the relevant line of commerce. However, since
Brown Shoe left open the question of the weight to be accorded any one
of the "practical indicia" of inter-product competition, a court may assign
whatever weight it chooses to considerations which the parties contend
are relevant in determining the product market. A court is free to
admit (as the Reynolds court did) that there are indications present
that would form an evidential basis for determining that two products
are in distinct lines of commerce, but proceed to hold that other indi-
cations dictate that a single line of commerce be recognized. Such an ap-
proach makes for unpredictability to say the least.
United States v. Continental Can Co.17 3 clearly demonstrates how an
application of Brown Shoe can result in the creation of an arbitrary
sub-market. Continental Can Company, the nation's second largest pro-
ducer of metal cans, acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the nation's third
largest producer of glass containers. It was conceded that the can industry
and the glass industry were relevant lines of commerce. However, the
government urged recognition of additional lines of commerce defined in
terms of the end uses for which metal and glass containers were in sub-
stantial competition. 7 4 Although the district court recognized inter-
industry 7 5 competition between glass and metal containers, it rejected,
with one exception (containers for beer) the government's claims that
existing competition between metal and glass containers had resulted in
the products markets urged by the government. It believed that the
government failed to make a distinction between "inter-industry or over-
all commodity competition and the type of competition between products
with reasonable interchangeability of use and cross elasticity of demand
which has Clayton Act significance.'
7 6
The majority of the Supreme Court believed that no such distinction
was necessary. They recognized that glass and metal containers have
different characteristics which may disqualify one or the other from a
particular use; that the machinery necessary to pack in glass is different
from that used to pack in cans; and that a particular user of cans or glass
ordinarily packs in only one or the other container and does not vacillate
from day to day as prices fluctuate. But the terms "competition" and
"reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand" as
used in Section 7 or in Brown Shoe were not intended to limit the
172. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 162, at 323.
173. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
174. These were containers for the beer industry, the soft drink industry, the
canning industry, the toiletry and cosmetic industry, the medicine and health industry,
and the household and chemical industry.
175. For the purposes of this case, the word "industry" was used to refer to an
aggregate of enterprises employing similar production facilities and producing the
same products. United States v. Continental Can, supra note 173, at 444, n.2.
176. United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 781-82 (1963).
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competition protected by Section 7 to that involving identical products.
Furthermore, it was not necessary for interchangeability to be complete
and cross-elasticity of demand immediate. Citing Browrn Shoe for the
proposition that interchangeability of use was not to be employed to
obscure competition, but to "recognize competition where, in fact, compe-
tition exists," the Court found that competition did in fact exist between
metal and glass containers. The record indicated that metal had replaced
glass and glass had replaced metal as a leading container for some im-
portant uses and each was trying to expand its share of the market at
the expense of the other. 7 7  It was immaterial that the record failed to
identify all end uses for which competition between metal and glass
containers existed, since the Court believed that complete inter-industry
competitive over-lap did not have to be shown. There was sufficient data
from which to conclude, at least prima facie,17s that "the area of competi-
tive over-lap between the two product markets was broad enough to
warrant treating as a relevant market the combined glass and metal




However, even though the Court was willing to draw the product
market lines broadly enough to correspond with what it believed to be
"competitive reality," it was not willing to include within this product
market other materials competing for the same business. It was admitted
that there may be a broader product market made up of metal, glass and
other competing containers, but the existence of such broader markets
did not necessarily negate the grouping of cans and glass into a single
sub-market. The Court justified such a restriction of theproduct market
merely by quoting its statement in Brown Shoe that "within the broad
177. United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 173, at 453.
178. The Court stated that its holding was based on the evidence "thus far
revealed by the record" and that it had only made a prima facie determination as to
the relevant line of commerce. 378 U.S. at 466. Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his con-
curring opinion, noted that since the district court dismissed the complaint at the
close of the government's case, upon remand, defendant could not only rebut the
prima facie inference that metal and glass containers may be considered together as
a line of commerce, but could also prove that plastic or other containers in fact
compete with metal and glass to such an extent that as a matter of "competitive
reality," they must be considered as part of the relevant line of commerce. Id. at 466.
However, even as a mere prima facie inference, delineation of the product market
in this manner places an unfair burden on defendant. Cf., Handler and Robinson,
A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kelauver Anti-Merger Act, 61 COL.
L. Rnv. 629, 650 (1961).
179. Id. at 456. The Court justified fixing the relevant line of commerce across
industry lines:
Since the purpose of delineating a line of commerce is to provide an adequate
basis for measuring the effects of a given acquisition, its contours must, as nearly
as possible, conform to competitive reality. Where the area of effective com-
petition cuts across industry lines; so must the relevant line of commerce; other-
wise an adequate determination of the merger's true impact cannot be made.
Id. at 457.
The line of commerce thus fixed by the Court was not pressed upon the district
court. But the Court believed that since it was "co-extensive with the two industries,
which were held to be lines of commerce, . . ." and since it was composed "largely,
if not entirely, of the more particularized end use lines urged by the government
in the District Court .... [see supra, note 174,1 nothing precluded them from reach-
ing the question of its prima facie existence at this stage of the case.
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market, well defined sub-markets may exist which in themselves consti-
tute product markets for anti-trust purposes.
' 
180
On the basis of the Brown Shoe opinion the Court in Continental
Can undertook the following reasoning process in fixing the relevant line
of commerce. In determining the outer boundaries of the product market,
competition must be recognized "where, in fact, competition exists." Thus
even though competition between glass and metal containers was not com-
plete, there was what the Court believed to be substantial competition.
Therefore, the combined glass and metal container industry was a
relevant line of commerce. However, even though there may have been
competition between glass and metal containers and, other packaging
materials, the inter-boundaries of the sub-market had to be limited to
glass and metal containers since "within the broad market well defined
sub-markets may exist."
Delineation of the sub-markets in such a manner substitutes arbitrari-
ness for economic analysis. If the Court was willing to recognize areas
of competition between glass and metal containers, it should have also
been willing to recognize areas of competition among glass and metal
containers and other materials competing for the same business. If
competitive reality was to be the all-important factor, competition among
glass, metal and other containers should have been examined. However,
since the guidelines set out in Brown Shoe call for a product market
definition that is both narrow and broad, the majority could summarily
dismiss certain areas of inter-product competition, while according full
weight to others.
In United States v. Aluminum Company of America,'8 ' the Brown
Shoe approach allowed the government easily to find a relevant market
on which to predicate a Section 7 violation. 8 2 There Alcoa acquired the
Rome Cable Corporation, a producer of both copper and aluminum
conductors. Alcoa, on the other hand, produced no copper conductors,
but did manufacture aluminum conductors. In defining the lines of com-
merce it was necessary to determine whether insulated aluminum con-
ductor was an appropriate line of commerce separate and distinct from
insulated copper conductor. The district court found: that the conductor
industry did not differentiate between copper and aluminum insulated
conductors; that copper and aluminum products are functionally inter-
changeable; and that there were no unique production facilities, dis-
tinct customers or specialized vendors for insulated aluminum conductor
products.' 88 While recognizing a price differential between copper and
aluminum insulated products, the district court believed that this did not
foreclose actual competition. It therefore concluded that insulated
180. Supra note 162.
181. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
182. See infra.
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aluminum conductors could not be regarded as a line of commerce dis-
tinct from their copper counterpart.
84
The Supreme Court did not dispute the district court's finding that
such competition existed,8 5 -but held that the degree of such competition
did not preclude their division for the purposes of Section 7 into separate
sub-markets, "just as the evidence of broad product markets in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, . . . did not preclude lesser sub-markets.'
18 6
The Court then proceeded to uncover a basis for holding that such a sub-
market existed. It appeared that in the field of overhead distribution the
competition of copper was decreasing. 8 7 The Court believed that the
record showed that fabricators of insulated copper conductors, utilizing
a high cost metal, were "powerless to eliminate the price disadvantage
under which they labor and they can do little to make their product
competitive, unless they enter the aluminum field."' 88 Therefore, sepa-
ration of insulated aluminum conductor from insulated copper con-
ductor and placing the former in another product market was "proper."
Further support was found for this differentiation in the conclusion that
aluminum conductor dominated the overhead field while copper con-
ductor remained "virtually unrivaled in other conductor applications.' 8 9
The Alcoa case vividly points out the insufficiency of Brown Shoe's
"practical indicia" in delineating the bounds of the relevant product
market. The Court could ignore findings which indicated that a single
product market existed for the two types of conductors while holding
that other indications - from which equivocal conclusions can be drawn
- dictated the recognition of distinct lines of commerce. The Court did
not consider the district court's finding of complete manufacturing inter-
changeability between copper and aluminum; nor did it consider the
ruling that there was no industry recognition of a sub-market, distinct
customers or specialized vendors for insulated aluminum conductor
products. Because aluminum conductor dominated the overhead field
while copper prevailed in all other conductor applications, the Court be-
lieved that the two conductors had distinct end uses. But as both
types could be used as electrical conductors and therefore there was
184. Id. at 510.
185, E.g. In 1959 insulated copper conductor comprised 22.8% of the gross addi-
tions to insulated overhead distribution lines.
186, United States v. Aluminum Company of America, supra note 181, at 275.
187. Insulated aluminum conductor's share of the total annual gross addition to
overhead utility lines was: 6.5% in 1950; 51.6% in 1955; 77.2% in 1959.
188. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, supra note 181, at 276.
189. Id. at 274. Having thus determined that insulated aluminum conductor was
an appropriate line of commerce distinct from its copper counterpart, the Court
held (also contrary to the district court) that aluminum conductor (bare and
insulated) was a submarket for purposes of Section 7: "Both types are used for the
purpose of conducting electricity and are sold to the same customers, electrical
utilities." Id. at 286. This is a non sequitur in light of the Court's rationale as to why
it held that aluminum conductor and copper conductor were distinct lines of commerce.
However, the Court believed that having made the latter finding, the conclusion that
aluminum conductor (bare and insulated) was a line of commerce was "a logical
extension of the District Court's holdings." Id. at 277, n.4. But see dissent Id. at 286.
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functional interchangeability between the two, areas of competitive over-
lap existed. To the Court, the price difference between the two types
of conductors set them further apart. To ignore such a differential in
determining the relevant line of commerce was "to ignore the single,
most important, practical factor in the business."'190 And the district
court's conclusion that this price difference did not foreclose actual
competition would seem reasonable. There was functional interchange-
ability; there were no unique production facilities; nor were there
distinct customers or specialized vendors. In short, there was that type
of supply and demand flexibility which could be used to eliminate a
price disadvantage.
Brown Shoe gave the courts considerable latitude in fixing the "line
of commerce" for Section 7 purposes. As a result, in some cases a line
of commerce has been invented - "a line of commerce which sprang into
existence only when the merger took place and will cease to exist when
the merger is undone."'' Granted, no precise rules can be set down for
determining the relevant line of commerce in each case. But the Court
in defining product markets having Section 7 significance must use more
than the ad hoc approach which Brown Shoe allows. The Court should
strive for some semblance of definiteness which up to now has been
entirely absent.
The criteria set forth in Brown Shoe to determine the appropriate
geographic market was essentially the same as that used to determine the
relevant product market. Just as a product sub-market was to be con-
sidered the appropriate "line of commerce," a geographic sub-market
was also to be considered the appropriate "section of the country." The
geographic market had to "correspond to the commercial realities of the
industry and be economically significant."' 9 2 Consequently, the geographic
market in some instances could encompass the entire nation, while under
other circumstances it could be as small as a "single metropolitan area."
The Court construed "any" in "any section of the country" quite literally:
The fact that two merging firms have competed directly on the
horizontal level in but a fraction of the geographic markets in which
either has operated does not, in itself, place their merger outside
the scope of Section 7. That section speaks of 'any . .. section of
the country,' and if anticompetitive effects of a merger are probable
in 'any' significant market, the merger - at least to that extent
- is proscribed.
93
190. Id. at 276.
191. United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 173, at 476 (Mr. Justice
Harlan dissenting).
192. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336.
193. Id. at 337. The Court gave the following illustration:
If two retailers, one operating primarily in the eastern half of the Nation, and
the other operating largely in the West, competed in but two mid-Western citles,
the fact that the latter outlets represented but a small share of each company's
business would not immunize the merger in those markets in which competition
might be adversely affected. On the other hand, that fact would, of course, be
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The Court agreed with the undisputed conclusion of the district court
that insofar as the vertical aspect of the merger was concerned, the
relevant geographic market was the entire nation. Since "the relation-
ships of product value, bulk, weight and consumer demand" enabled
manufacturers to distribute their shoes on a nationwide basis (which
Brown and Kinney did), the anticompetitive effects of the vertical merger
were to be measured within this distribution area.
However, the Court did not agree with the lower court's conclusion
concerning the relevant geographic market to be used in analyzing the
horizontal aspect of the merger. The district court found that the effect
of the horizontal merger had to be analyzed in every city with a population
of over 10,000, as this was the only area in which both Brown and Kinney
operated retail outlets. 9 4 However, Brown wanted markets distinguish-
ing between what it believed to be different competitive situations. It
argued that in some cases the areas of effective competition should be
defined so as to include only the central business districts of large cities,
and in other cases so as to encompass the "standard metropolitan areas"' 95
within which smaller communities are found. But the Supreme Court
held that the district court properly defined the relevant geographic
market.196 The court's rationale in fixing the boundaries of the geographic
sub-market was similar to that utilized in fixing the boundaries of the
product sub-market. The geographic sub-market was to be large enough
to include important competitive factors, but small enough to exclude
those factors of little competitive significance. The markets fixed by
the district court were deemed "large enough to include the downtown
shops and suburban shopping centers in areas contiguous to the city,
which are the important competitive factors," and yet were "small
enough to exclude stores beyond the immediate environs of the city;
which are of little competitive significance."
1 97
The same approach used in Brown Shoe to determine the relevant
geographic market within which to analyze the effect of a horizontal
merger was followed in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.198
The Philadelphia National Bank (PNB) and Girard Trust Corn Exchange
Bank (Girard) were in the process of consummating a merger. PNB
194. The district court limited its findings to cities having a population of at least
10,000 persons, since Kinney operated retail stores only in such areas.
195. The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines a standard metropolitan area as
"an integrated economic area with a large volume of daily travel and communication
between a central city of 50,000 inhabitants or more and the outlying parts of the
area.... Each area (except in New England) consists of one or more entire counties.
In New England, metropolitan areas have been defined on a town basis rather than a
county basis." II U.S. Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Business: 1954, 3.
196. By so defining the geographic market, less than one-half of all the cities
in which either Brown or Kinney sold shoes through retail stores was represented.
But Brown admitted that if the districts court's holding in this respect was proper,
the number of markets in which both it and Kinney had retail outlets was sufficiently
numerous so that the validity of the entire merger could be judged by testing its
effects in those markets.
197. Brown Shoe v. United States, supra note 192, at 339.
198. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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was the second and Girard the third largest of the forty-two commercial
banks with head offices in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. This area
consisted of the city of Philadelphia and its three contiguous counties in
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia was the home county of both banks, but each
had offices throughout the four-county area. The issue before the Court
was whether the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area was the
relevant geographic market. The government claimed that it was, arguing
that the principal anti-competitive effect of the merger would be felt in
the area in which the banks' offices were located. The defendants, how-
ever, wanted a larger geographic market - one comprising the greater
part of the northeastern United States. The district court, agreeing with
the defendants, held that the four-county metropolitan area was not the
relevant geographical market because PNB and Girard adtively competed
with other banks throughout the greater part of the northeastern United
States.
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the government. To the
Court, the relevant question was not where the parties to the merger
did business or even where they competed. The merger was to be analyzed
within that part of the area of competitive overlap where the effect of the
merger on competition would be direct and immediate.' 99 This depended
upon "the geographic structure of supplier-customer relations. '200 Con-
venience of location was found to be the most important factor in the
geographic structure of depositor-bank relations. Since individuals found
it impractical to conduct their banking business at a distance, they usually
conferred the bulk of their patronage on banks within their local com-
munity. This inconvenience factor was held to have sufficiently localized
banking competition to require that the relevant geographic market be
limited to the four-county area in which defendants' offices were located.
201
Protection of the small depositor was an additional reason assigned
for limiting the relevant geographic market to the four-county area. The
defendants had argued that competitive alternatives were provided by
large banks (from New York and elsewhere) which solicited business in the
Philadelphia area and that therefore the relevant geographic market should
be structured so as to include these competitors. 20 2 However, the Court
believed that competition from outside the area would be important only
to the larger borrower and depositor. It therefore concluded that the four-
county area was a valid geographic market for assessing the effect of the
proposed merger upon the banking facilities available to the smaller
customers - "a perfectly good 'line of commerce' in light of Congress'
199. The Court at this point referred to BocH, MERGERS AND MARKETS 42 (1960).
200. KAYStN AND TURNER, ANTI-TRUST POLICY 102 (1959).
201. A substantial portion of defendants' business did in fact originate in this
four-county area.
202. One of the purposes of this merger was to enable defendants to be better able
to compete with these banks.
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evident concern, in enacting the 1950 amendments to Section 7, with
preserving small business.120 3
A further justification for limiting the relevant geographic market
to the four-county area was found in the need for a "workable compro-
mise." There was a need for "some fair intermediate delineation which
avoids the indefensible extremes of drawing the market either so ex-
pansively as to make the effect of the merger upon competition seem
insignificant, because only the very largest bank customers are taken
into account . . . or so narrowly as to place [defendants] in different
markets, because only the smallest customers are considered. '20 4 Large
borrowers and depositors might find it impractical to do their banking
business outside their home community, while small borrowers and
depositors may be confined to banking offices in their immediate neighbor-
hood. But the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area was believed
to "roughly . . . delineate the area in which bank customers that are
neither very large nor very small find it practical to do their banking
business .... ",205
Certain points should be noted from the above analysis of Brown
Shoe's product market criteria and its application in Philadelphia National
Bank. The relevant geographic market was not defined merely in terms
of the area of competition between the parties to the merger, but by the
area of substantial competition - the area of competitive overlap. Further,
Brown Shoe's footnote 65206 makes it clear that a merger can still be
proscribed even though the merging firms do not compete in every
"section of the country." Customers of the merging companies were
also considered. The area to which these individuals confined their
patronage was deemed important in determining the lines of the relevant
geographic market. Also, the type of customer was relevant in this
connection. This is evidenced by the Court's concern with protection of
small business, which caused it to draw the geographic market lines quite
narrowly. Moreover, in drawing these lines, the court looked at the over-
all competitive picture and employed a "workable compromise." If a
"workable compromise" results (as it did in Philadelphia National) in
intentionally drawing geographic market lines sufficiently narrow to pro-
tect the "small" customer and to "preserve" small business, such a
rationale can be justified. The Court would be carrying out the con-
203. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra note 198, at 360, n.37.
204. Id. at 361.
205. Ibid. The Court also noted that state law recognized the four-county Phila-
delphia metropolitan area as a "meaningful banking community" since it allowed banks
to branch within it, and that three federal banking agencies regarded this area as an"area of effective competition" in connection with defendants application to them for
permission to merge.
206. ".... Footnote 65 ... in the long run will probably be the most significant (if it
is followed by the Supreme Court) element of Brown Shoe." Statement of Robert A.
Bicks in Implications of Brown Shoe for Merger Law and Enforcement, 8 ANTIRrUST
BULL. 225, 234 (1963). The suggestion was made that it would allow partial divesti-
ture where the merging companies competed in a limited number of localities.
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gressional mandate to protect "competition, not competitors. '207 However,
such an approach has the same defect as the similar one employed in
fixing the relevant product lines. Both make for unpredictability in an
area where predictability is essential.
C. The Effect on Competition
Having delineated the relevant product market, the Court proceeded
to consider the impact of the merger; for if the probable effect would
be to substantially lessen competition in any section of the country, it
would fall within the ban of the Act.
20 8
1. The Vertical Level
Regarding the vertical aspect of the merger, the Court relied on three
criteria to strike it down. The primary factor was stated to be the
share of the market foreclosed. But as a separate element it would be
determinative only where the merger was of either monopolistic or de
minimus proportions. In all other cases foreclosure was thought to be
significant only when related to two additional factors - the nature
and purpose of the arrangement and the history of the particular
industry.
209
Relying on the testimony of Brown's president 210 and the pattern
which emerged from prior Brown acquisitions,211 the Court analogized
the merger to a tying agreement.212 Since such a contract is inherently
anti-competitive, it need only be shown that a relatively small share of
the market was foreclosed.213 And as the instant merger involved one of
the largest foreclosures possible in the industry,214 the Court had no
difficulty in finding a serious threat to competition.
Finally, the structural development of the industry was examined
and found marked by a growing trend toward concentration through
207. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 192, at 320. See also, id.
at 315-16.
208. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1956).
209. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962).
210. The testimony demonstrated Brown's avowed purpose was to supply the line
of high quality shoes which Kinney would require as it continued to expand into
the suburbs. T. 1323.
211. Brown consistently supplied between 30 and 50 per cent of the requirements
of its acquired outlets. United States v. Brown Shoe, 179 F. Supp. 721, 724-27
(E.D. Mo. 1959).
212. In the case of International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947),
the Court held that in any case involving a tying arrangement a substantial lessening
of competition could be inferred from a finding that a not insignificant volume of
commerce was affected.
213. This is to be distinguished from a requirements contract, which may be at
the request of the buyer, and which requires a weighing of the probable impact upon
competition. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961): See
Generally, Handler, Recent Antitrust Development, 71 YALE L.J. 75, 81-88 (1961).
214. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 2, at 331-32. Brown was the
fourth largest manufacturer while Kinney, with over 350 outlets, was the leading
independent retailer.
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vertical acquisitions.21 5 This merger would only serve to accentuate the
trend and destroy the fragmented character of the industry. And once
such a trend is discovered, the contention that the industry remains vigor-
ously competitive will not be heard.
Combining these factors with a reading of Legislative history that
found a Congressional intent to halt such trends at their inception, the
Court concluded that the merger should be prohibited.
it is clear that the design of Chief Justice Warren was to go beyond
the facts of the case and enter into a comprehensive discussion of the
amended section. Equally apparent is the writer's intent to establish a
flexible approach, as evidenced by his refusal to rely on any one element
without relating it to the other criteria discussed. Indeed, much of the
criticism of the opinion is based upon an alleged failure to make adequate
use of the economic data available on each issue.216 Yet in light of these
objectives, the opinion represents an application of the Court's interpre-
tation of the policies of the Act,217 and not an extensive investigation into
the validity of the underlying economic theories. Thus, a merger which
does not entirely deprive an industry of its competitive nature may
sufficiently impair it to fall within the purview of the Act. An analysis
of the Court's rationale indicates that such economically based criticisms
are often wide of the mark.
a. The Share Foreclosed
Prior to the merger Kinney's controlled 1.2 per cent of the market
and was the largest independent retailer in the industry. At that time
it supplied 20 per cent of its own requirements. Post acquisition data
shows that two years after the merger Brown was supplying 7.9 per cent
of Kinney's needs. 218 Thus the actual share foreclosed at the time of the
decision was less than one-tenth of 1 per cent. And even if Brown should
supply 50 per cent, its highest previous total, the share foreclosed would
only slightly exceed .5 per cent.
How, then, did the Court conclude that the merger would sub-
stantially lessen competition? If Justice Harlan's approach2 1 9 is adopted,
the significance of the foreclosure increases greatly. For Kinney repre-
sents a substantial portion of the market available to independent manu-
215. In the period from 1945 to 1956 International Shoe gained 130 outlets, Shoe
Corporation of America acquired 541, and Brown itself obtained all of its 845 outlets.
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., supra note 211, at 737-39.
216. Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 9 ANrITRUST BULL. 587 (1964)
76 HARV. L. Rev. 183 (1962) ; But see Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and The
Brown Shoe Decision; 51 Gto. L.J. 706, 736-44 (1963).
217. This is widened by the Court's lengthy review of the legislative history.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 311-23.
218. For a discussion of the validity of such a before-after statistical comparison,
see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960).
219. Mr. Justice Harlan contended that the crucial figure is the percentage of the
market foreclosed to independent manufacturers. Since the industry was heavily inte-
grated, this figure would far exceed 1.2%. 370 U.S. 294, 369-74 (Dissenting opinion).
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facturers. Yet the fact that those manufacturers who relied on Kinney
for up to 40 per cent of their sales would be seriously injured does not
necessarily mean that competition in an industry with over eight hundred
manufacturers would be adversely affected.220 When the further factor
of the ease with which these firms could develop their own outlets,
22 1
or with which new retailers could enter the market, is considered, the
objection that the Court is protecting competitors, 222 and not merely
competition, seems justified.
But the Court did not proscribe the merger solely because of this
factor. Nor did it claim that this merger would of itself render the
industry non-competitive. It only concluded that it tended to have this
effect. The additional criteria considered by the Court seem to justify this
result.
b. Exclusionary Practices
The Court relied to a large extent upon the conclusion that the nature
and purpose of the acquisition was inherently anticompetitive. Drawing
heavily upon Section 3 cases,223 the Court concluded that the merger had
all the vices of a tying contract plus the added disadvantage of permanence.
The clear purpose of the acquisition was to force Brown shoes through
Kinney's outlets. Therefore the share foreclosed need not be as great
as if the purpose had been to secur- sources of supply to the retailer.
2 2 4
In the latter situation it would more closely resemble a requirements
contract, which may 'be initiated by the customer, and is not necessarily
anticompetitive.
The relevance of this distinction is questionable.2 25 The Act is not
aimed at a particular type of merger, but rather at all acquisitions having
the proscribed effect on competition. Further, the standard of the Section
is completely objective. Absent a showing of detriment to competition
the motivation behind the merger should be immaterial. To use intent as
a basis on which to predicate such a result hardly seems to demonstrate
probable effect.
It should be noted that the Court's view of exclusionary practices
is not unchallenged. It has been suggested that these are actually weapons
of competition, equally available to all competitors, and that the Court
220. Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 587 (1964).
221. In its discussion of Legislative history the Court recognized the importance
to be attached to this factor Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 322.
See generally REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 326-37 (1955).
222. Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 587, 599-
600 (1965).
223. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
224. Comment, 59 Micn. L. Rev. 1236, 1244-50 (1961).
225. Barnes, The Primacy of Competition And The Brown Shoe Decision, 51
Gto. L.J. 706, 739-40 (1963).
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is interfering with a desirable trend in the industry.226 This argument,
however, goes directly against Congressional intent 227 as well as the Court's
view as developed in the Section 3 cases.
This divergence of approach does suggest, however, the basic split
between Congress and the Court on the one hand and many economists
on the other - a totally distinct view of what constitutes competition.
To the former, the elimination of a significant market necessarily has an
adverse effect upon competition. And the Court will not content itself with
theories as to overall competitiveness in the industry when the case before
it shows the available market on the decline. Nor can the Court accept the
idea that the trend toward integration will increase competition. To
allow wholesale vertical mergers in the hope that the resulting industry
would be equally competitive would be to ignore Congress entirely.
The economist, on the other hand, is concerned with the allocation
of resources to uses so as to obtain maximum efficiency for the benefit
of the ultimate consumer. 228 On the basis of this premise it has been
pointed out that the industry could absorb sixty mergers of this size
and still maintain a vigorously competitive posture.229 And if such is the
natural object of the dynamics of the industry, it is urged that the Court
should not interfere. The Court seems to meet these contentions in its
discussion of the history of the industry.
c. The Incipiency Theory
Accepting the district court's findings that a cognizable trend toward
concentration existed in the industry, the Court concluded that this was
precisely the time to implement Congressional intent and arrest the trend
before it gained additional momentum. The industry was still fragmented,
a condition which the Congress desired to retain where possible.
230
It has been argued that the Court was careless in interpreting the
available data, and that while the number of mergers had increased, there
was no overall increase in market power. Rather these acquisitions had
only permitted the manufacturers to retain their former share of the
market.281 Yet granting this to be true, without such mergers the industry
would have been more competitive as a result of continued fragmentation.
In any case there are advantages to be gained through a mere increase
226. Bork & Bowman, supra note 216, at 594-95.
227. The opinion includes a thorough investigation into the legislative history,
and its several statements from the Congressional Record which support the theory
that Congress was attempting to preserve small business as an economic way of life.
See, e.g., 95 CONG. Rxc. 11486, 11489, 11494-95, 11498 (1949); 96 CONG. Rtc. 16444,
16448, 16450, 16452, 16503 (1949).
228. Comment, 72 YALP L.J. 1265, 1273 (1963).
229. Bork & Bowman, supra note 222, at 598. But see, Ceer, Facts About Anti-
trust Myths, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 607, 619-20 (1964), where it is suggested that this
argument ignores the nature of the industry and the clearly demonstrated trend
toward concentration.
230. See note 227, supra.
231. Bork & Bowman, supra note 229, 597-98.
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in physical assets, and it has been suggested that these may be sufficient
to indicate that the industry is likely to become less competitive.8 2
Such reasoning does not augur well for future mergers. Developed
to its full extent, an incipiency based argument could be used to strike
down all but the most insignificant mergers. But this also ignores the
flexibility of the Court's approach, and the underlying theories.
d. Social Policy and Congressional Intent
In its attempt to effectuate legislative intent, the Court has taken
a protectionist attitude toward small business. It will not sanction the
use of vertical acquisitions to gain a significant competitive advantage.
Indeed, the case has been said to stand for the proposition that a manu-
facturer will not be able to attain, through forward integration, ad-
vantages resulting from economies of scale.23 3 Nor will it approve a
merger which will foster a trend toward increased concentration through-
out the industry. This leads to a two-part inquiry: (1) Is the Court's
reading of legislative history justified and (2) To what extent should the
Court take cognizance of economic theories.
The Court found an express purpose to retain local control over
industry and protect small business. 2 4 It is interesting to note that the
Court here relied upon the arguments made by the co-sponsors of the
amended section while it rejected their views in its discussion of the




The Chief Justice also found a desire to retain "other values,"
and cited Learned Hand's view that the antitrust laws are aimed at
preserving industry in small units for its own sake and regardless of
cost.2 86 This is a clear statement that waste is to some extent a necessary
by-product of antitrust legislation. With such support in the Congressional
Record it is not surprising that the Court refused to be guided by purely
economic considerations as to what constitutes competition. So long as
the Court is following the Congressional design, arguments which go
to the underlying policy issues should be addressed to the Legislature.
But the Court has not restricted itself to such a role.
In the Philadelphia National Bank237 case Justice Brennan largely
ignored the economic evidence proffered by both parties and dealt ex-
232. See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. Rlv. 54, 183-
87 (1962).
233. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. EcoN. Rzv. 236, 240-41
(May, 1961, No. 2; separately paginated). Contra, Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act:
A Review of Enforcement Policy, in ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC
POLICY 125 (1963).
234. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 315-17.
235. Id. at 313-14.
236. . . . it has been constantly assumed that one of their [the Anti-trust
statutes] purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite
of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units . . . United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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tensively with extra-judicial economic theory. While analysis of market
behavior has long been considered relevant, the use of market structure
as interpreted by theorists is a questionable basis upon which to predicate
a finding that competition will probably be substantially impaired.
Such an approach opens the Court to justifiable criticism, 238 par-
ticularly since the Bank cited no economists, and the authorities relied
on by the Court are not definitive. Indeed Kaysen and Turner,239 the
authors cited most frequently by the Court, began their work with the
premise that the present laws are in need of drastic revision. If the
Court is to assume a leading role in re-examining policy, it should not do
so without considering all of the relevant authority.
e. Recognized Defenses
The Chief Justice was careful to mention particular situations where
the Amended Section would not apply. First, he stated that two small
companies could merge in order to be better able to compete with the
industry leaders.240 This defense was first advanced and flatly rejected
in the Bethlehem Steel case, 241 where it was argued that the merger
would increase competition with the industry leader U. S. Steel. The
court stated that a consideration of benefits to one section which would
.flow from a merger that would substantially lessen competition in another
area is outside the judicial scope.2 4 2 But it is clear that the case did not
involve small companies.
The defense was also urged in the later Philadelphia National Bank
case24 3 in that the merger would increase competition with the New York
banks. This was combined with the argument that countervailing social
and economic benefits mentioned in Brown were present in the form
of the greater prosperity which would accrue to the entire Philadelphia
area. This contention lost its vitality once the Court determined the
relevant geographic area, for the merger involved the leaders within
the four-county area.244 But the Court emphasized that the defense would
be available where the factors enumerated in Brown were present.
This defense seems to be justified. A merger of two such small
companies would add a strong competitor which hopefully would increase
its market share at the expense of the dominant firms. And where the
companies control relatively small market shares, foreclosure resulting
238..... judicial notice of an economic theory so inconsistent with the present
policy of the antitrust laws that its proponents recommend a legislative amend-
ment to effectuate its implementation seems suspect as a judicial tool.
Comment, Government Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Revolving Door of Phila-
delphia Bank, 62 MICH. L. REv. 990, 1007.
239. KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1959).
240. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 331.
241. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
242. Id. at 617-18.
243. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963).
244. Id. at 363, 364.
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from a vertical acquisition would not be excessive. Nor would the
resulting market share in a horizontal merger be so large as to otherwise
preclude it.
This balancing process allows a flexible approach whereby a merger
with beneficial effects may be approved, if the size of the companies is
not so large as to offset its value. But where it is so great as to seriously
affect competition among the smaller firms, the price of increasing compe-
tition with the industry leaders is too high.
Only the countervailing power argument would have been available
in the Brown Shoe case. But the Court concluded that the merger
would have demonstrable anti-competitive effects "without producing
any countervailing competitive, economic, or social advantages. ' 245 It
is doubtful whether the Court was suggesting that a showing of re-
sulting economic and social benefits would suffice to immunize the merger,
where its anticompetitive effects were substantial. But this quote does
indicate that a larger share might be foreclosed where such benefits could
be shown than in cases where these advantages were not present.
This element was present, along with the failing company doctrine
in the subsequent Lever Brothers case.246 There the failing company,
Monsanto, controlled 55 per cent of the low sudsing market and 5 per cent
of the heavy duty detergent market through its product "All." Despite
this large market share, advertising and promotional costs consistently
exceeded profits, and Monsanto was determined to go out of business.
Lever Brothers, although a significant factor in the heavy detergent
market, had suffered severe setbacks in its attempts to enter the low
sudsing market. Although extending section 7 to include the acquisition
of a trade name,247 the court upheld the merger. The case has been
interpreted as an application of the failing company doctrine.
This exception, first developed in the International Shoe case,
248
has received the continued approval of both courts and Congress. It
permits the acquiring company to interpose an absolute defense where
1) the acquired company was so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation
so remote that it faced the grave possibility of a business failure, 2) there
was no other available purchaser, and 3) the purpose was not to lessen
competition but to "facilitate the accumulated business" and avoid
injurious consequences which would otherwise be probable. Subsequent
cases established the requirement that the entire company, and not merely
the division acquired, be on the verge of insolvency.2 9 Nor has a com-
245. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 334.
246. United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
247. Lever Brothers' contention that the mere acquisition of a trade name was
not an asset within the meaning of Section 7 was rejected by the Court. This aspect
of the decision is approved in 58 Nw. L. Rev. 692 (1963).
248. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). See Generally, Com-
ment, 61 Micn. L. Rgv. 566 (1963).
249. Farm Journal, Inc., 53 FTC 26 (1956).
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pany qualified where its liquidation has been entirely voluntary. 250 And
the current approach of the FTC requires a showing that had the merger
not intervened, a reasonable probability was that insolvency would fol-
low. 2
51
The underlying rationale is that the public interest is served by keeping
a company in business for the advantages it gives the community -
employment and economic well-being. That rationale certainly is appropri-
ate in Lever Bros., even though Monsanto was not insolvent, for the
decision to abandon the product was final. And added to the public
interest in keeping "All" in the industry, was an increase, rather than a
depreciation in competition, according to available post-acquisition data.
Thus the countervailing economic and social benefits mentioned in Brown
are clearly present. This case is an excellent example of the value of
the flexible approach taken in Brown. For in the heavy detergent market
the merger increased the market shares of the four leading competitors
from 85 to 90 per cent, which would have led to automatic proscription
under a fixed standard.
The Lever Brothers case, however, will not aid appreciably in evaluat-
ing future mergers. It involved an unusual set of facts, Lever Brothers
being the smallest of the four companies which dominated the heavy
detergent market. Whether the same result would follow had one of the
other companies attempted to acquire Monsanto is uncertain. The Brown
Shoe opinion failed to restate the requirement of International Shoe
that there be no other available purchaser, an omission which may be
highly significant. However had another company purchased "All",
competition would not have been benefited, and the "countervailing factors"
of Brown would not be present. The least that should be required is that
the smaller competitor be given priority where a failing company is
involved in order to both increase competition and protect the public
interest.
2. The Horizontal Level
Many of the criteria already discussed, and particularly those which
go to the underlying policy considerations, were also applied to the
horizontal aspect of the merger. The principal distinction is that there
no share had been foreclosed, and analysis centered about the size of the
market share controlled by the merged complex.
a. The Market Share
The Brown-Kinney share of the retail market varied from 5 to
57 per cent in the relevant geographic areas. In fourty-seven selected
250. Cf. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961),
wherein the court stated the defense may be permitted when the corporation is in such
dire financial straits that its termination and subsequent dispersal of its assets seems
inevitable.
251. Pillsbury Mills Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1960-61 FTC Cas.) f 29277.
784 [VOL. 10
51
Editors: The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SUMMER 1965]
cities the share exceeded 5 per cent in all three lines of commerce.
Concluding that the district court had selected representative markets
in which to judge the probable effects,252 the Court deemed the merger
likely to have a substantial anti-competitive impact, and therefore struck it
down. While regarding market share as the prime indicator of the
validity of the merger, the Court continued its flexible approach by
relying on a combination of factors.
b. Future Mergers
The Court reasoned that to approve the instant merger would force
it to sanction all subsequent mergers in which the resulting market share
did not exceed 5 per cent, thereby fostering the oligopoly which Congress
sought to prevent. The difficulty with this approach is that every merger
furthers oligopoly to some extent, and thus it has been stated that the
Court is tending toward a per se rule.25 3 A further criticism is that even
if there were wholesale mergers up to 5 per cent, a supposition which
presumes an intent unsupported by the record, the industry would still
contain far too many retailers to constitute an oligopoly. 25 4
Thus it seems that the Court was reiterating its incipiency argument,
for it also made reference to a rising concentration in the industry. Com-
bining these two elements, the Court apparently feared approval of this
merger would provide the impetus for a further rash of mergers. And
while certainly an effective means of preventing concentration, it is also
a method of protecting localized business, an avowed goal of the Court.
As to the contention that the increase in mergers had not resulted
in an increase in market power, the answer is that absent these mergers,
the industry would have become further atomized, a highly desirable de-
velopment.2 55 And in any case a substantial increase in physical assets im-
ports a significant anti-competitive advantage.
c. The Large Chain Operation
By virtue of its size, the Brown-Kinney chain was thought to have
the potential to drive smaller competitors out of business. It could insulate
certain stores from competition, and through its ability to rapidly change
styles thereby render independents incapable of maintaining a competitive
inventory.
Here the Court seems to have stretched the incipiency argument to
questionable lengths. Brown was not shown to have the ability to become
a leader in styles. Yet the Court accepted the possibility of such develop-
ment as sufficient. And even should Brown attain such a status, the
assumption is that it will act with a predatory intent. The Court, then,
252. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 338-39.
253. Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and
Size, 9 VILL. L. REv. 211, 215-16 (1964).
254. Bork & Bowman, supra note 229, at 599.
255. Celler, supra note 22, at 622-23.
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is condemning the capacity so to act. But whether this creates a
probability that competition will be so injured, rather than a mere possi-
bility, is doubtful. But this reasoning becomes more convincing when
the relationship between the retail chain and the manufacturing operation
is considered.
d. Advantages of an Integrated Complex
The Court further objected to the competitive advantages that a
large integrated chain would possess. By eliminating wholesalers and
increasing volume the retail outlets could sell at prices approximating
cost.2 56 Increased efficiency, then, was relied on to strike down the
merger. After recognizing that beneficial effects might accrue to the
consumer, and that the act was designed to protect competition, and not
competitors, the Court concluded:
But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote corppe-
tition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.
Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
We must give effect to that decision.
25 7
The Court is not protecting "competition" as defined by the economist,
but rather that form of competition which is waged by small, independent
businesses. This is the surest way of preserving competition generally
throughout an entire industry.
VI.
PNB: PRESUMPTIVE ILLEGALITY*
From the broad principles laid down in Brown Shoe more specific
standards had to be carved out in order to establish some degree of
certainty. The case of United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank25 8 repre-
sents one of the initial efforts in that direction.
The case involved a proposed consolidation between the Philadelphia
National (PNB) and Girard Trust Corn Exchange (Girard) banks,
respectively the second and third largest in the Philadelphia area.
25 9
There were, at that time, forty-two commercial banking establishments
in the four county area, some fifty-eight having been eliminated by mergers
during the last fifteen years. Both PNB and Girard had participated
256. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 344. This conclusion
has been questioned, since the ability to withstand fluctuations may be due to factors
such as pre-existing wealth which existed prior to the merger. 76 HARV. L. Rlv.
183 (1962).
257. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 209, at 344.
* Conrad J. DeSantis, Edward J. O'Malley, Richard A. Wilmans.
258. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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heavily in this rash of merger activity2 60 which had resulted in concen-
tration of 90 per cent of the area's total banking resources in the seven
largest establishments.
As required by statute,261 the prior approval of the Comptroller
of the Currency was obtained, even though the Attorney General, as well
as the other two banking agencies, had recommended that it be disap-
proved.262 The Justice Department immediately brought this action to
enjoin consummation of the merger. However, the District Court 263 upheld
the Comptroller, and an appeal ensued.264 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the merger would violate Section 7.
The government's case was predicated largely upon finding a violation
of the Sherman Act.26 5 Indeed, the consensus of opinion appears to
have been that bank mergers did not fall within Amended Section 7,
since banking activities generally were subject to an extensive and
systematic regulatory scheme.2 66 And the majority, after examining the
nature of commercial banking in the United States, concluded:
Federal supervision of banking has been called probably the
outstanding example in the federal government of regulation of an
entire industry through methods of supervision. . . . The system
may be one of the most successful (systems of economic regulation),
if not the most successful.
2 67
However, Mr. Justice Brennan then proceeded to distort the legisla-
tive history and concluded that Clayton 7 was applicable. In light of
the fact that the consolidation was neither a pure stock nor a pure assets
acquisition, he concluded that the literal language of Section 7 was not
controlling, and consequently treated the case as one of first impression. 268
260. Since 1950 PNB has increased 59 per cent in size due to mergers, while
Girard grew by 85 per cent.
261. 73 Stat. 460 (1959), 12 U.S.C.A. § 215 (Supp. IV, 1964).
262. The Bank Merger Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(Supp. IV, 1963), provides:
No insured (by FDIC) bank shall merge or consolidate with any other insured
bank, or either directly or indirectly, acquire the assets of . . .any other insured
bank without the prior written consent (i) of the Comptroller of the Currency if
the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a national bank....
In the interests of uniform standards, before acting on a merger .. . the
agency shall request a report on the competitive factors involved from the Attor-
ney General and the other two banking agencies referred to in this subsection
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) ....
263. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
264. Under Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1958).
265. As Mr. Justice Harlan remarked:
I suspect that no one will be more surprised than the Government to find that
the Clayton Act has carried the day for its case in this Court. (Dissenting
opinion at 373).
266. In 1956, Representative Celler introduced an amendment to § 7 (H.R. 5948)
designed to prohibit any bank acquiring "the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation also engaged in commerce. . . ." See also, Gruis, Antitrust Laws
and their Application to Banking, 24 Gno. WAsH. L. Rev. 89 (1955) ; Klebaner,
Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 75 HARV. L. Rev. 756 (1962).
267. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 330 (1963).
268. Had the consolidation been a pure asset. acquisition it would have been
exempt, since the amended section extends only to asset acquisitions of those com-
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The Court then concluded that the legislative intent was to reach "the
entire range of corporate amalgamations, from pure stock acquisitions to
pure asset acquisitions, within the scope of Section 72"269 Nor were the
legislatively prescribed controls which pervaded the industry, and, more
specifically, the Bank Merger Act of 1960, deemed a sufficient basis for
inferring that Congress intended to insulate banking from the prohibitions
of Amended Section 7. The Court found that since the 1960 legislation
was enacted to cover the possibility that Clayton 7 would be held in-
applicable, it would "do no violence to that design by dispelling the un-
certainty.
'270
The Court further concluded that no exemption was conferred.
Citing the general proposition that "[i]mmunity from the anti-trust laws
is not lightly implied," 27 ' it held that there was not a sufficient showing
of a Congressional intent to permit the evasion of Section 7.
While this aspect of the opinion has been the subject of a good
deal of criticism it is not difficult to appreciate the dilemma facing the
Court. A ruling that the Amended Section was inapplicable to bank
mergers would have stripped the Court of all future control, regardless
how obviously detrimental to competition the merger might be. The
alternative, finally adopted by the Court, was to substantially disregard
the Congressional Record and through a strained interpretation of the
Amendment gain control of the banking industry.
272
While the decision represents a clear case of judicial usurpation, it
nevertheless appears to have been the wiser course. Nor does it force the
Comptroller to abdicate the role intended by Congress. Indeed, in cases
where the effect upon competition is less clear, the Court may yet treat
the Comptroller's rulings with great deference.2 3 And even though
Congress apparently did not intend to include banking under Section 7,
it regarded vigorous competition as highly desirable. That wish, at least,
will apparently be effectuated by the Court.
Having concluded that Section 7 was applicable, the Court turned
to a consideration of the probable effect of the merger. The real issue
here was the determination of the relevant geographic market, which
is fully discussed, supra. For once it was determined that the merger
was to be evaluated in the four county area, the conclusion that it be
prohibited was a certainty.
panies "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission;" and under
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act it has no jurisdiction over banks. 38 Stat.
717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
269. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 (1963).
270. Id. at 349.
271. California v. FTC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). This case held that FPC
approval of a merger did not render Clayton 7 inapplicable, even though other com-
petitive factors had been taken into account pursuant to the statutory command.
272. Comment, Government Regulation of Bank Mergers: The Revolving Door
of Philadelphia Bank, 62 MIcH. L. Rpv. 990, 997-1001 (1964).
273. 9 VL. L. Riv. 317, 324 (1964).
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The effect of the merger would be to invest the resulting bank
with 36 per cent of the deposits, as well as total assets, and 34 per cent
of net loans in the four county area. The four largest banks in the area
would have 78 per cent of the total assets. In light of the dimensions of
these percentages, it is far from startling that the merger was proscribed.
Rather, the significant factor is the approach adopted by the Court.
Realizing that "unless businessmen can assess the legal consequences
of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning is retarded,
' '274
the Court stated that elaborate proof of market structure may be dis-
pensed with wherever it can be done without violating Congressional in-
tent. The Court then concluded that "[w]ithout attempting to specify
the smallest market share which would still be considered to threaten
undue concentration, we are clear that 30 per cent presents that threat. '275
In arriving at this result the Court largely ignored the massive testimony
compiled in the District Court and relied instead on various extrinsic
economic treatises.
276
It should be stressed that, technically at least, the Court was not
laying down a per se rule wherein a finding that the resulting market share
exceeded 30 per cent would automatically require that the merger be
struck down. Rather, in such a case, the government need not embark
upon an elaborate demonstration of market structure, as that burden
is shifted to the proponents of the merger. And while this may in practice
place an insurmountable burden upon the merging companies, it at least
purports to allow a consideration of other factors where they are
deemed appropriate.
Nor is this approach inconsistent with the rationale of Brown Shoe.
For that Court recognized that in certain situations a violation would be
clear, while in others it would be equally apparent that the merger was
lawful. Rather it was the intermediate gray area at which the extensive
analysis in Brown Shoe was directed.2 7  Thus the Philadelphia National
Bank decision is in no way contrary to Brown Shoe. Rather it repre-
sents the initial attempt to specify the limits within which a Brown
type analysis must be undertaken.
274. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
275. Id.. at 364.
276. The propriety of this approach generally has been discussed above. As for
the theories of Kaysen and Turner, those authors proposed an attack upon existing
"market power," a term they defined as "[t]he persistent ability . . . to restrict out-
put or determine prices without boring a substantial share of the market. .... "
Once such power is demonstrated, the company will be broken up, unless it is the
result of certain specified factors. Only by limiting undue marketpower will desirable
levels of economic performance be maintained. KAYS4N & TURNzR, ANTITRUST
PoLIcY (1959).
277. ... [T]he legislative history of Section 7 indicates clearly that the tests
for measuring the legality of any particular economic arrangement under the
Clayton Act are to be less stringent than those used in applying the Sherman Act.
On the other hand, foreclosure of a de miinimis share of the market will not
tend "substantially to lessen competition." Brown -Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 328-29 (1962).
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The underlying thesis involved is that certain market behavior is
inextricably interwoven with certain market structures, and that once
the structure is confirmed the market behavior will be presumed without
necessity of further proof. 278 While the proposition is not universally
accepted,2 179 it would appear sufficiently well founded to permit the Court,
in the interest of certainty, to shift the burden of proof in a relatively
extreme situation such as existed here.
The minimum limit which the Court will eventually prescribe as the
test is by no means certain. The primary source relied upon suggests a
figure of 20 per cent.2 8 0 Whether the Court will reach this figure, or one
even more restrictive, depends largely on the emphasis placed upon the
"intense Congressional concern with the trend toward concentration." 8'
VII.
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
A further question presented to the courts was whether to extend
the scope of Amended Section 7 to other types of arrangements. As
previously noted, it was held to include banking and other regulated
industries, as well as the acquisition of patent and trade names. It has
recently been determined that conglomerate mergers should also be in-
cluded.
The language of Amended Section 7 is not particularly well suited
to a determination of the issues presented by a conglomerate merger. For
while certain measurable anti-competitive effects necessarily result from
both horizontal and vertical acquisitions, the same cannot be said
where no meaningful economic relationship existed prior to the merger.
In such cases there is no percentage or share of the relevant market to
be utilized in assessing the competitive impact of the merger. For this
reason it has been suggested that perhaps Congress never intended to
include conglomerates under Section 7.282 The courts, however, have
rejected this view and begun to develop the necessary standards.
278. Comment, "Substantially to Lessen Competition . . .", Current Problems of
Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALs L.J. 1627, 1638 (1959).
279. Miller, Book Review, 49 GAo. L.J. 385 (1960) ; Keyes, Book Review, 29 Ggo.
WAsIi. L. Rev. 184 (1960).
280. KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959). Other suggested figures cited
by the Court are 25 per cent (Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7:
A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 489, 521-22 (1957)) and 20 per cent (Stigley,
Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 176, 182 (1955)).
A somewhat different approach was taken by Bok, who suggested that a firm should
not be permitted to increase its relative size by more than 8 per cent. Bok, Section 7
of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226,
308-16 (1960).
281. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
282. Adelman, Acquire the Whole or Any Part of the Stock or Assets of Another
Corporation, A.B.A. Antitrust Sec., 111 (1953) ; Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in
Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958). But see 49 VA. L. Rev. 852 (1963),
where it is suggested, quite properly, that the Congressional intent as interpreted in
Brown Shoe requires that conglomerate mergers be included in the Amended Section.
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The first of these, the so-called "deep-pocket" theory,2 3 originated
in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC.284 That case involved the acquisition
of Arrow Brands, Incorporated, one of eight companies converting
aluminum for the florist trade, by Reynolds, the country's largest producer
of aluminum foil. 28 5 While the customer-supplier relationship between
the two companies indicated that the acquisition was basically vertical,
the court declined to treat it as such.
2 8 6
Instead, the court relied upon the contrast between Reynolds' immense
financial resources and the limited capital available to Arrow's competitors
to strike down the merger. The decision, therefore, does not depend
upon any pre-existing relationship in a given market. Rather, it suffices
that the wealth thereby injected into the acquired firm will create signifi-
cant competitive advantages.
As to the contention that the government had not demonstrated
probable anti-competitive effects the court stated:
It is sufficient if the Commission shows the acquisition had the
capacity or potentiality to lessen competition. That such a potential
emerged from the combination of Reynolds and Arrow was enough
to bring it within Section 7.
2 17
However, the court emphasized that it was not laying down a per se
rule, and proceeded to discuss several of the mitigating factors enumer-
ated in Brown Shoe. It recognized, for example, that under similar
circumstances a merger might be justifiable under the "countervailing
power" doctrine.
It is unfortunate that the case did not present a closer factual situa-
tion, as this is one of only three significant decisions in the conglomerate
area.2 8  But in light of the vast differences in financial resources, and
283. In the recent Consolidated Foods case the Court held that a merger which
creates an atmosphere conducive to reciprocal buying "if the probable consequence of
the acquisition is to obtain leverage in one field or another." While the Court did not
lay down a per se rule, it only required a minimum showing as to the probable anti-
competition effects. This was probably due to the difficulties in obtaining and tabulat-
ing relevant data. In addition, there was substantial post-acquisition data which
reinforced the Court's conclusion. 33 U.S.L. WUK 4377 (1965).
284. 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
285. The court's conclusion that the florist foil converting industry was the
relevant sub-market is fully discussed, supra ......... For the present discussion it
need only be noted that, prior to the merger, Arrow accounted for 33 per cent of the
relevant market while Reynolds' total assets were valued at 733.2 million dollars.
286. After noting that the merger would foreclose 33 per cent of the relevant
market, the court continued:
However, neither the examiner nor the Commission rested their conclusions that
Section 7 had been violated on this basis, nor should we. Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC, supra note 168, at 229.
287. Id. at 229-30.
288. A test similar to the one under consideration was utilized by the FTC in the
Procter & Gamble case. There, the merger was struck down because Procter &
Gamble's advertising and promotional ability would give Clorox, the acquired firm,
the distinct advantage of better advertising at lower costs. Thus, except that advertis-
ing ability rather than finances were being transferred, the cases are identical.
Procter & Gamble Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. f" 15, 773 (FTC Feb. 28, 1962). See
generally, 49 VA. L. Riv. 852 (1963).
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the wealth of past acquisition data, the court was not forced to undergo
an extensive economic analysis in order to arrive at this conclusion.
Yet to make the above quoted statement it was necessary to assume
that Reynolds would transfer its wealth to Arrow, and that it would
subsequently be utilized in such a way as to injure competition. It has
been suggested,289 however, that Reynolds would effectuate such a transfer
only if the expected rate of return be greater than that available
elsewhere. The mere fact that the transfer has been made would indicate
that the industry affords an opportunity for greater than average profits.
And if this be true, Arrow's competitors would be able to obtain similar
resources. Thus, the court should not interfere, as it is arresting a
desirable economic trend merely to preserve competitors, and not compe-
tition. In addition, it is argued that Section 2, which prohibits destructive
price-cutting, affords an adequate degree of protection.
Yet even if the foregoing is accepted, the criticism appears to be
unjustified in light of the Brown Shoe decision. Indeed, it appears that
the Reynolds Court religiously applied the rationale underlying that de-
cision. For here the industry was comprised of small, sparsely capitalized
firms. Entry into the market was extremely easy, and competition in-
tense. An infusion of substantial capital into one of the firms could
only create a serious imbalance in the industry, requiring Arrows' competi-
tors to obtain similar financial backing. If the Court in Brown Shoe
was willing to halt an existing trend before it transformed the entire
industry, there is no reason why a merger which would of necessity
initiate such a trend should be tolerated. The contention that an entire
industry should integrate to achieve maximum efficiency should not be
heard in the wake of Brown Shoe. The objection that the Court is actually
protecting competitors is equally without merit.2 0
VIII.
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT*
-For the last 30 years, it hasn't seemed to matter who brews the
the witches' broth - Republican or Democrat .... It always seems
to come out stronger - and to many tastes - more bitter.21
A. Criteria for commencing actions
The implications of the Brown Shoe case2 2 which are explored in
this note, supra, and in practically every journal and trade regulation
289. 72 YALE L.J. 1265 (1963).
290. This is basically the same aigument that was directed against the Brown Shoe
decision. See text, supra p. 778 et seq.
* Robert 0. Mickler.
291. Address by Abe Fortas, (Arnold, Fortas & Porter, Washington, D.C.), Third
Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, October 15, 1964, transcript p. 106.
292. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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treatise, are as varied as the individual views of all the authors.293 While
the product market aspects have been explored supra, this part of the
note will deal with the "general mood or climate of merger enforce-
ment" 294 viewed in the light of Brown Shoe as well as subsequent develop-
ments.
1. The Merger of Law and Economics.
295
Throughout the history of our Anglo-Saxon Common Law, signifi-
cant developments have been forged by lawyers and their clients who
wished to avoid certain of its rules and sanctions. Anyone reading the
English property statutes 296 "must have been struck by the consistency
with which important Acts of Parliament were ignored or circum-
vented." 297 Such a student must also contrast the inaction of the English
Parliament with that of our own Congress and the running battles between
our elected representatives and the trial counsel and lobbyists.
298
293. An excellent example of the disagreement was given at the meeting of the
Subcommittee on Section 7 of the Clayton Act, Section of Antitrust Law, American
Bar Association, held on Sunday, August 5, 1962. Some of the views expressed were:
(page references are to the transcript of that meeting).
Mr. Edgar Barton (a distinguished New York practitioner in the antitrust field)
The intent of the Chief Justice in writing the opinion he has written was to
convey a general mood or climate . . . and he took the opportunity to go into a
very long harangue on part ... of the legislative history that lay behind Section 7.
You don't find any reflection of that permission for area expansion-by-merger
in legislative history in this decision. I think there is no question. The mood of
the opinion is horrible as far as Section 7 is concerned. Pp. 7-9.
Mr. George Reycroft (Chief of Section Operations of the Antitrust Division,
Justice Department) :
I would have to say that the mood is great. It has very optimistic overtones
for the cases we now have pending. . . . In the shoe industry there was not a
high degree of concentration, and I think the court's mood was obviously one of
preventing that concentration taking place. Pp. 9-10.
Mr. Joseph Sheehy (Chief of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Restraint
of Trade):
I certainly wouldn't classify that carefully considered judicial opinion of the
Chief Justice as an "harangue," not by the wildest stretch of the imagination. I
think it is going to be very helpful to us in many of the cases we have up ...
P. 10.
Mr. J. Wallace Adair (formerly, Chief of the Division of Mergers, FTC, now
private defense counsel) :
I think what the Supreme Court has said is that Congress set the mood and
left it to the Court to determine the factors to be considered .... I expect we will
see cases brought on a pure market share. P. 11.
294. Id. at 7. Remarks of Frederick M. Rowe, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
295. The subtitle comes from Professor Bok's article, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rsv. 226 (1960).
296. Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 Edw. I, c.1, Statute of Uses,
27 Hen. VIII, 1536, c.10, Statute of Enrollments, 27 Hen. VIII, 1536, c.16, and others.
Reprinted in AM. JUR. 2d, Desk Book, documents nos. 104, 109 and 110, respectively.
297. CASNgR & LtACH, CAS4S AND TtXT ON PROPERTY 387 (1950).
298. The most notable is the contest between Congress and its taxpayers, the latter
continually inventing devices to take advantage of loopholes in the revenue laws and
the former plugging up the loopholes as discovered and, likely as not, laying the lash
over the backs of the discoverers. The antitrust laws and the labor laws are other
notable examples. Id. at 387-88.
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The most recent major encounter is the 1950 Amendment to Section
7 of the Clayton Act 299 and the litigation in its wake. Prior to that time,
it was assumed that any firm could increase its size by acquiring or
merging with another firm unless the impact on competition was very
substantial. In fact, the Supreme Court as late as 1948 refused to accept
the argument (advanced by the minority) that the Sherman Act was
aimed at bigness per se and that the mere elimination of substantial
competition through the purchase of a competitor was illegal.3 0 0  As
was seen, this freedom to merge was shortlived when the 1950 Amend-
ment sounded its death knell. It was then settled that mergers with
competitors, suppliers, customers and even previously unrelated busi-
nesses were forbidden where the effect of the merger would (or might)
lessen competition substantially or tend to create a monopoly.
3 01
The remaining question of what amounts to a substantial lessening
of competition or how much concentration tends to create a monopoly
raises the problem. Here Congress left it up to the enforcement agencies,
the FTC and Department of Justice, and to the courts to determine where
the lines were to be drawn. It is suggested, without an attempt at
resolution of the problem, that size alone - bigness - is the key which
triggers investigations and sways the courts against the companies.
30 2
Averting to the Supreme Court opinion in the 1920 United States
Steel case 303 and its most famous and oft-quoted passage,30 4 it is pointed
out that the legislature and antitrust enforcement officials constantly talk
and act as if size alone were an offense.
80 5
Additional factors in the bigness equals violation equation are the
quantitative nature of the data available and the fiscal problems of the
two enforcement agencies. It has been shown that the 200 largest manu-
facturing firms made 1,956 acquisitions between 1951 and 1962 and that
339 of the acquired firms had over $10 million in assets. In fact, 216 of
the top 1,000 firms in 1950 have since been acquired.300 The rich get
richer!
Against this background, we have the statements of representatives
of the FTC and the Justice Department that the number of cases will
299. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
300. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
301. The statute reads: "where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation . . . so acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1950).
302. Marcus, New Weapons Against Bigness, 43 HARV. Bus. Rev. 100 (Jan.-
Feb., 1965).
303. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
304. Id. at 451: "The Corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size.... But we
must adhere to the law and the law does not make mere size an offense or the existence
of unexerted power an offense."
305. MARCUS, supra note 302, at 100.
306. Mueller, Statement before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate. Judiciary Committee, July 2, 1964, reported in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRD ANNUAL CORPORAT4 COUNSEL INSTITUTE 3, note 3 (Oct. 15, 1964).
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remain small. 3° 7 Of approximately 1,300 corporate mergers in 1963 only
17 were the subject of litigation. 08 The explanation is that "it is not the
shortage of mergers that troubles us . . . it is the shortage of men to
handle the mergers we can possibly handle." 0 9 Of course, there are no
statistics available to show how many contemplated mergers have been
abandoned because of an antitrust phobia. They probably concern large
companies in highly concentrated industries who are sensitive to anti-
trust dangers and rightly fear the probabilities of an attack,
It must also be noted that in the recent Lexington Bank case 310 the
"majority of the Supreme Court distinguished to death '31 1 the Columbia
Steel case mentioned earlier. This case (Lexington Bank), the Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank case3 12 and the more recent Continental Can case 313
seem to indicate that a detailed inquiry is no longer necessary, at least
where the size of the market foreclosed exceeds 30 per cent.
Whatever is necessary - and the "magic number"3 14 is not yet
authoritatively determined - it is clear that size plays an important
role. And that, apparently, is the end of agreement. There are those
who were disappointed when the government failed to follow Brown
Shoe with a program against bigness and those who were angered by
"intemperance" in enforcement. 315
It is suggested, and rightly so, that the Supreme Court has "not yet
gone to the point of holding that there can be inferred from mere
aggregation [absent specific elimination of direct competition] the actual
or potential injury to competition required by the statute." 316 Yet the rule,
hoped for by some, that concentration alone is sufficient must be dis-
tinguished from the rule that only the impact on the structure of markets
is relevant. Concentration alone is not an adequate proxy for all the
determinants of competitive behavior.
"No longer is concentration a means of determining whether firms
are likely to have the ability to control [competitive] variables. [But if
Philadelphia National Bank is followed] relative size ...becomes an evil
in itself."3 17 It may be that any direct, present or prospective competition
or vertical relationship will bring the case within the prohibition of
307. Subcommittee Meeting, supra note 293.
308. Fortas, supra note 291, at 111.
309. Subcommittee Meeting, supra note 293, at 24. Among the mergers abandoned
during the past year when challenged under Section 7 were those involving Allied
Chemical and General Foam, Humble Oil and Tidewater, and Chrysler and Mack
Truck. 1964 ANNUAL SURVEY oF AM. L., Trade Reg. 124, n.5.
310. United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
311. Address by Glen E. Weston before the Third Annual Corporate Counsel
Institute, October 15, 1964, transcript p. 7.
312. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), noted in
9 VILL. L. REv. 317 (1964).
313. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
314. Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure
and Size, 9 VILL. L. REv. 211, 217 (1964).
315. 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. L. 153, 154.
316. Fortas, supra note 1, at 114.
317. Hall & Phillips, supra note 314, at 218.
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Section 7. The Court, to date, has set aside acquisitions only where
this has been found to exist or to be reasonably anticipated,318 although
Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in the Continental Can case319 flatly stated
the majority was "laying down a 'per se' rule that mergers between two
large companies ... are presumptively unlawful under Section 7.
"132o
Certainly there still are industries wherein combinations of two firms
would not be regarded as a substantial threat to competition. "But there
is a feeling among many antitrust lawyers that the rules now established
• . . give Section 7 such a broad scope that the extent of its application
• . . [will] depend upon work - allocation and policy decisions"
321
of the enforcement agencies.3 22 It is this aspect, this broad agency
discretion coupled with virtually 100 per cent acceptance of their decisions
by the Court3 23 that must be the "battleground of the next few years."
3 2 4
2. The Effect of Size
As mentioned above, 323 one of the main reasons for the bigne~s
presumptively equals violation formula is the lack of men and equipment
in the enforcement agencies and the resultant selective determination of
the "enemy." This was discussed at the meeting of the Subcommittee
on Section 7 in 1962326 at which Mr. Joseph Sheehy, Chief of the
FTC's Bureau of Restraint of Trade stated: "When [Edgar Barton,
New York practitioner] says that the Commission . . . considers that
a merger is bad because they have brought it, I have to agree with him
because we sift those out of thousands and we just don't bring [an
action] unless they are bad."32 7 But a more important weapon in the
hands of the government is the process of determining the relevant market.
This has been discussed elsewhere in this note,3 28 but must be explored to
some extent at this point.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet held that mergers of or by
industry giants are per se illegal because of the size (either of the
acquiring, acquired or amalgamated company) or of the pure market
share,329 the Court seems inclined to validate any action by the enforce-
318. Fortas, supra note 291, at 114.
319. 378 U.S. at 467.
320. Id. at 476.
321. 162 BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADg RAG. Ri. B-5 (1964).
322. See text at n.30 supra.
323. Fortas, supra note 291, at 115.
324. Ibid.
325. See text at n.307 sutra.
326. Subcommittee Meeting, supra note 293.
327. Id. at 30.
328. Cf. supra 766 et seq.
329. Some apparently feel this has been done indirectly, if not directly. See text
footnoted 26, 27. And another author has concluded, "'drastic competitive injury'
simply means loss of business. So a merger is illegal if (1) it involves a big company
and (2) small business concerns afterwards lose sales. Competition - pure, workable,
effective, or whatever - has vanished, replaced by protectionism." Adelman, T he
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ment agencies so long as they have some basis, however slight, for finding
a present or prospective"3 O threat to competition. It thus appears important
to note just what has been done in this area since 1962.
Since the relevant market area decisions have been covered supra,
it will perhaps be sufficient to examine and contrast two recent Supreme
Court cases. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America;33 (Alcoa),
the government33 2 attacked Alcoa's acquisition of Rome Cable Corpora-
tion which produced but 0.3 per cent of the bare aluminum market
in competition with Alcoa. They also competed for the purchasers of
insulated aluminum wire and the combined market shares for both
products (bare and insulated wire) were 27.8 and 1.3 per cent respectively.
This, the Department felt, was a share sufficient to justify divestiture.
The defendants argued that the customers concerned were users of
overhead wire for conducting electricity and that they could use copper
wire as easily as aluminum. The district court333 accepted this argument
and decided that the combined share of the overhead conductor market
which the particular companies enjoyed was insufficient to support the
action. On appeal, the plaintiff convinced the Supreme Court that, although
the end use was basically the same and the products were similar,
34
the insulated aluminum wire was sufficiently distinct from the copper to
allow the two to be separated into submarkets.33 5 On this basis, the
Court sided with "Justice".
In the second of the two cases turning on definition of relevant
product market (United States v. Continental Can Co.),8s° the government
was faced with an attempted merger between companies producing
different products (metal vs. glass containers). Here, too, the district
court decided against the government s 7 and held that Section 7 had not
been violated because there was not sufficient cross-elasticity of demand
for the two types of product.
The Supreme Court, finding that some food stuffs were packaged
in both types of containers and that some producers switched from one
to the other, 38 decided there was at least a prima facie showing that
metal and glass containers belonged in the relevant product market and
that the acquisition violated Section 7.
330. Adelman, supra note 329.
331. 377 U.S. 27 (1964).
332. The action was brought by the Department of Justice.
333. 214 F. Supp. 501 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
334. Substantially similar were the physical characteristics and capabilities of the
two products, the classes of customers and sellers and the production facilities.
335. Differences include an almost two-to-one ratio in price (copper-to-aluminum)
and differences in the installation costs of the two products thereby tending to equalize
the final costs-to-consumer.
336. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
337. 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
338. It was also relevant that the producers of each type package were constantly
seeking to expand their sales at the expense of the other and that the potential pur-
chasers consider the relative prices in determining which material to use.
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There are, of course, many more cases (and there will be more yet
in the future), but these two serve to illustrate seemingly contradictory
positions taken by the government and acceptance by the Supreme Court
of any possible quantum of proof that the merger may substantially lessen
competition. In Alcoa the plaintiff was required to and did show that
products with similar characteristics belonged in separate product sub-
markets, while in Continental Can Co. products with obviously different
characteristics were successfully shown to. be sufficiently similar to
constitute but a single market.
Thus it may well be that a clear finding for the government on any
one of the relevant market criteria is sufficient to justify their chosen
relevant market - indeed, this may be implicit in the very concept of
sub-markets. But this has never been as apparent as in the recent cases.
These have given the government great latitude in the attack-point of
a merger and have made defense of mergers attacked under Section 7
extremely difficult. In fact "the current state of the art of market definition
means that the subjectivity and arbitrariness of merger standards are
significantly increased. '33 9 And other cases of the same term3 40 indicate
that this "art", this very versatile weapon in the hands of the govern-
ment, will become critical when the concept of potential competition
becomes mature.3 4 1 If the Court is determined to block all mergers at
whatever cost in efficiency on a showing of some injury to competition,
a not unlikely conclusion in view of its recent highly protective viewpoint,
then it would be better to so state in explicit language. "Manipulation
of the concept . . . so that plaintiffs [government] invariably prevail can
only lead to confusion.
'3 42
B. Responsible Formulation
Where does all this lead? If we can confidently predict the Court
will validate most any action which reaches its docket; if it will be
resourceful in finding criteria indicating violation of Section 7; if that
is ,the poitent 343 to be derived from the recent decisions, then
the FTC and the Department of Justice have a profound obligation
carefully to determine when and whether the public interest will
be served by attacking an acquisition.
3 44
These agencies, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Com-
mission, now wielding important and largely discretionary power can no
339. Hall & Phillips, supra note 314, at 229.
340. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) ; United States
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
341. See note 330, supra.
342. 1964 SUPRM4 COUR' RFv. 171, 189.
343. Fortas, supra note 291, at 106, explains the title of his address ("Portents for
New Antitrust Policy") as "Prophecies for a New Antitrust Policy of a Sinister, Evil
or Forbidding Character."
344. Id. at 116. (Emphasis added.)
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longer be considered merely "the enforcement agencies" (as referred
to above). But their policies in determining the types of acquisitions to
attack, coupled with almost guaranteed success in selective forays due
to fiscal and manpower limitations3 45 lead necessarily to a different con-
clusion. They must, as must Congress and the courts, recognize that
they are in the business of economic regulation. The host of aborted
mergers 46 as well as the Clayton-conscious decisions of management
to amalgamate regardless, 47 stand as mute testimony to this function
of the agencies.
Thus the agencies must "candidly and thoughtfully face the full
implications of their roles"3 48 in the regulation process. No longer a
branch of "whodunit" law enforcement, they must accept the role of
regulation "cast in the form of individual, adversary proceedings. 3 49
With the "new" Clayton Act beginning to drift toward per se illegality
in extreme cases, 350 the government agencies as well as Congress and
the Court, must justify the direction in which we are heading. It may
be that a per se approach would simply shorten and streamline the
judicial process of an inevitable result. "Or, one might hold that re-
gardless of economic performance, an unconcentrated market structure
is a social good."351 But it may also be that there are many situations
in which mergers and acquisitions may be beneficial and not harmful to
the economy;352 that the free-wheeling economy requires tolerance for
mobility and an assumption that no avenue of growth or expansion
"should be arbitrarily foreclosed except on the basis of a serious, sober
showing of overriding public necessity in the particular case.1353 What
is needed, in the minds of some, is a rule of reason that would permit
constructive mergers to meet competitive situations. We may ask, as did
Mr. George H. Love, Chairman of the Board of Chrysler Corporation (after
the government effectively blocked3 54 the acquisition of Mack Truck
by Chrysler) : "Does the forced spending of capital on uneconomic plants
345. Text at note 309, supra.
346. Id. et seq.
347. "There are still a few whose attitude is like that of the fellow who came to
his lawyer during the days of OPA and asked him for advice as to how he could
violate OPA legally. There are even ... a few who don't care, and, who will run for
luck in a collusive arrangement, hoping they won't get caught." Fortas, supra note 291,
at 110.
348. Fortas, supra note 291, at 116.
349. Id. at 117.
350. Some people believe "that there is no such thing as a good merger - that
acquisition of control of one company by another is contrary to the national interest -
regardless of effect or lack of effect on competition: In other words, that it is canni-
balism; and everybody knows that people shouldn't eat people." Fortas, supra note 491,
at 112.
351. Hall & Phillips, supra note 314, at 216.
352. E.g., a merger resulting in a combined entity able to challenge an industry
leader without detriment to others in the industry.
353. Fortas, supra note 291, at 118. "Our three branches of government are vested
with the protection of our rights and the greater coincidence of those rights will
determine the paramount interest, condemning all infringements thereof." Comment,
10 VILL. L. REv. 117, 130 (1964).
354. See note 20, supra.
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[the only resultant avenue now available to Chrysler for expansion] make
American industry more competitive in world markets? ' 855
These are the elements which the policy makers must and should
consider and on which any forthcoming public confidence will or can
be based. The antitrust laws are the Magna Charta of our competitive
system and, as such, are neither statist nor socialistic in concept. They
are, and well should be "measures designed in response to a felt necessity
to preserve and guarantee a social and economic order. . . . [W] hether
they are wise or foolish, effective or futile, is therefore a legitimate and
important matter for public concern. ' 358 And faced with this "profound
obligation" the agencies must justify their actions and their policies not
only in terms of whether they win in the courts but in terms of economic
effect.
C. Proposed Reforms
The Clayton Act is and continues to be a viable force and "an im-
portant and effective medicine for collusive and restrictive arrange-
ments."3 57 In the antimerger area, there is a need for (and a use for,
since business is not yet "critically ill") a preventive and energizing
vitamin.
1. A New Ingredient
The most subtle and unpublicized first step in the right direction is
the institution of Trade Regulation Rule proceedings announced by Com-
missioner Philip Elman3 58 in Permanente Cement Co.359 This will pro-
vide for a study and consideration of the problem3 60 throughout the entire
cement industry. The Commission has apparently realized that it may
be "uneconomical, inefficient, and inequitable"36 ' to proceed on a case-
by-case attack. Such a procedure86 2 will produce a "better forum" than
355. Love, Address to the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School Alumni
Society reported in 176 BNA, ANTITRUST & TRADs Rep. A-5 (November 24, 1964).
3M. Connor, F.T.C. Procedure Revisions: A Critique, 7 VIL. L. Rv. 359,
360 (1962).
357. Fortas, supra note 291, at 110. He there states that in the collusive area, most
businessmen accept the diagnosis that they're sick and that "antitrust may be applied
without offense even to holy scripture" if it participates in the collusive violations.
See Comment, supra note 353.
358. Commissioner Elman has been credited with placing the FTC in the fore-
front of innovation with his "incisive mind and persuasive pen." To him is attributed
"the most comprehensive conglomerate merger opinion yet written in the Procter &
Gamble-Clorox acquisition case." [The Procter & Gamble Co., TRAD. ReG. RrP. 16,
673] (FTC Transfer Binder 1963). Weston, supra note 311, at 18, 19.
359. 3 CCH TRAMS Rzo. Rtp. 16, 885 (FTC Transfer Binder 1964).
360. Id. at 21, 924:
In recognition that the problem of vertical merger.., is of growing importance
and urgency and has apparently assumed industry-wide dimensions, the Commis-
sion has determined forthwith to institute a Trade Regulation Rule proceeding for
the study and consideration of this problem.
361. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
362. The announcement in the Permanente Cement Co. case gave no details as to
how it will proceed but an indication may be gleaned from an address before the
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would be offered by adjudicative proceedings against individuals who
have taken the initiative in organizing and appraising the economic and
market facts so important and relevant to Section 7.
In commenting on the Trade Regulation Rule announcement,
Westion 6 3 noted that Commissioner Elman may have retreated 6 4 some-
what from his earlier expectations and found the Commission's desire
to depart from the tried-and-true case-by-case tradition "rather disquiet-
ing"36 5 because there is no opportunity given for cross-examination and
rebuttal of the government's economists (if the cigarette advertising cases
offer any valid precedent) and because the "cement [and other] industry
may discover that 'concrete cases make hard law' [when the rules]
prove to be more rigid than the industry's best product."36 6
Abe Fortas, on the other hand, found the announcement "a welcome
indication of a realization that something more is necessary, in dealing
with the economic - legal problem of mergers, than guerilla warfare or
cavalry raids."3 67 And others have agreed that comprehensive industry-
wide examination of the problems may be the only (or at least the best)
effective and fair way of applying Section 7 in the long run.8 68 This
may be particularly true in industries where the merger trend is merely
reflective of reaction to depressed or fast-changing economic conditions.
The relative merits of such a procedure have been discussed as
long ago as May, 1962 when Commissioner MacIntyre prompted the
FTC to establish the Bureau of Industry Guidance for the formulation of
such rules for anti-deceptive practices. At that time it was questioned
whether they would be substantive in nature so as to have the force and
effect of law or merely the vehicle of announcement of Commission
policy.369 They also pose the interesting and perplexing question as to
National Industrial Conference Board on March 5, 1964, at which Commissioner Elman
discussed a hypothetical rulemaking proceeding for mergers in the widget industry
(reported in Weston, supra note 311, at 20)
After public hearings at which the FTC economists' study is introduced and
-all interested persons have been given a chance to submit data, views and argu-
ments, the Commission would issue a report and promulgate "rules or standards
that define the lawful limits of merger activity in the industry." The rules would
specify particular markets in which mergers would be forbidden, identify the class
of firms which by reason of size or other characteristics would be forbidden to
make further acquisitions, and also the class of firms which would be permitted
or even encouraged to engage in merger activity. RIP per se merger illegality:
... If these rules are not obeyed the FTC would bring formal cease and desist
proceedings under Section 7.
363. Id. at 21.
364. In remarks before the Briefing Conference on Antitrust and Trade Regula-
tion Law, September 24, 1964, he stated that the object of rulemaking procedures "is
not to promulgate per se rules or codes rigidly demarcating the lawful limits of merger
activity" but that it should be regarded as "primarily a method of inquiry"; of finding
facts, appraisal of the situation and publication of the conclusions. Ibid.
365. Id. at 24.
366. Ibid.
367. Fortas, supra note 291, at 119. Mr. Fortas did recognize that at least some
of the particulars of the Rule are "dubious" as well as laborious and time-consuming.
368. 1964 ANNUAL SURVEY Or AM. L., 137 n.49 (1965).
369. 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY or AM. L., 176-7 (1963).
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the relative role of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
in the light of such FTC Rules.
Whatever the final outcome of the Commission's Rules, it is interest-
ing to note that their guns have mulitiple ammunition and that they are
using all available resources. On May 3, 1965, the hearing examiners
determined that two cases 370 involving the antimerger provisions of
Section 7 should be reargued before all present members of the Com-
mission. Aware their action would further extend the already lengthy
period between complaint and decision, they decided "the advantages of
a single approach to the mutual problems presented by these cases more
than outweigh the disadvantages inherent in lengthened proceedings."3 7 '
In these decisions Commissioner Elman found himself in the minority
since he felt that these cases should be disposed of without further delay
(in fairness to the defendants), and that the Commission could thereafter
move along "into a broad industry-wide administrative approach'.
72
2. Other Regulatory Components
The predecessor to the Trade Regulation Rules is the pre-clearance
procedure now available. (An important by-product of merger clearance
practices is the consent decree). The practitioner is probably fairly
familiar with this aspect of the Commission's work (which in this
case includes similar services by the Department of Justice) which sup-
plements the investigation of proposed and actual prosecutions on govern-
mental initiative.
For the unfamiliar, corporations contemplating or interested in
acquisition of additional facilities by merger may submit a request for
an advance statement of whether the government will undertake or with-
hold action if the company should proceed.Y The request and reply
(as to the likelihood of government action) 374 are treated with full
confidence and no extensive field investigation is made. In the event the
merger is consummated, the agency may re-examine the actual case and
determine its course of action free from any commitment in the reply.
The relative criteria at that time is the same as in non-submitted cases
with the additional factor of advance warning. One author, while con-
370. National Tea Co., No. 7453, FTC, April 5, 1963; Grand Union Co., No. 8458,
FTC, July 23, 1962.
371. Reported in 200 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-4 (May 11, 1965).
(Emphasis added.)
372. Ibid.
373. Jacobs, Merger Clearance Problems, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 187 (1956).
374. The clearance letter generally states that the agency "does not presently intend
to take action . . . though it reserves the right" to do so in the light of subsequent
developments. On the other hand, a denial states the merger "may result in a violation
of the antitrust laws ... and the government cannot undertake to withhold proceedings"
if the merger is completed. Id. at 188. It is noted later in that article that some
mergers are consummated after a denial letter but that action is withheld for various
reasons; principally fiscal considerations mentioned earlier in this note. Five other
reasons are given (though not intended to be inclusive). Id. at 193-94.
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demning such procedure as "snares for the unwary, hoaxes perpetrated
upon the unsuspecting, and, at best, ritual dances more notable for
their form than for results,' 3 7 5 would nonetheless like to see established
a small committee - "a Non-Royal Commission" - of public and
private professionals to analyze the relative merits by industry and to
establish a general set of categories and standards, implemented by
a new form of pre-clearance.
Finally, mention must be made of other, foreign systems of regulation.
Article 85(3) and Regulation 17 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC)3 70 provides for compulsory pre-notification
of contemplated restrictive trade practices.
Regulation 17 contains complicated rules specifying which agreements
are subject to the notification requirement. . . . Questions of timing
are of the utmost importance, since the thrust of Regulation 17 is
to attach different consequences to timely or tardy notification.
3 77
For American firms with business relations in Europe, the implication
is clear that the situation demands immediate attention. And as an added
feature the Treaty requires the EEC Commission to forward all notification
information to the appropriate national authorities as well as to publish
its decisions.
3 7 8
In this connection, it is well to note that Representative Emanuel
Celler (D-NY), Chairman of the House Antitrust Subcommittee has
re-introduced legislation (H.R. 7780) which would require companies
to notify the Attorney General and the FTC at least 60 days prior to the
projected consummation date of any proposed merger.379 It should be
unnecessary to explain the implications of this bill. Only note that Represent-
ative Celler has sponsored similar bills in three previous Congresses. Similar
legislation in Canada permits that government to keep appraised of develop-
ing trends though "to establish illegality, the merged companies must
be shown to be put in a position to exercise virtually complete control
over the trade or industry.
'380
Thus, with our neighbors to the North and across the Atlantic im-
proving (?) on our system by coming forward with pre-action regulation
and our own agencies espousing new theories (backed to the hilt by
Congress and the Court) we now find ourselves taking stock in a position
375. Fortas, supra note 291, at 120.
376. EEC includes Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands.
377. Lozowick, Antitrust Procedures of the European Economic Community, CCH
COMMON MARKET REP. 1 9021, at 7593 (Report 9, 1962).
378. Id. at 7604. See also, Ver Loren van Themast, Antitrust Policy in the
Common Market, 1963 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N ANTITRUST LAW SyMPOSiUm 41 (1963)
Forrow, The Common Market Antitrust Regulations, 17 Bus. LAW. 560 (1962).
379. 199 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE ING. REP. A-18 (May 4, 1965).
380. Henry, Annual Report to the Minister of Justice, reported in 172 BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-13, A-14 (October 27, 1964).
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where changes of some kind must be made. Whether we advance to a
per se illegality while still on an ad hoc system or develop an integrated,
all inclusive planned approach (with the planners responsive to the
popular will) is a question which cannot now be answered with assurance.
Ix.
CONCLUSION
It is somewhat of an anomaly to entitle the final portion of any paper
on Section 7 of the Clayton Act a conclusion. For the preceding dis-
cussion strongly suggests that the most significant period of anti-merger
litigation has hardly begun.
The 1950 Amendment established a substantially different frame-
work within which to assess the impact of a given merger. Yet in the
twelve years prior to Brown Shoe there was surprisingly little litigation.
However, in that case the Court chose to enter into a comprehensive
discussion of Amended Section 7, wherein it demonstrated a willingness
to stringently enforce Congress' avowed purpose of preserving existing
competition as an economic way of life. An incipiency-based approach
was therefore adopted as the surest method of continuing this system.
Yet even in the wake of that omnific opinion there was a good deal of
uncertainty, much of which is traceable to the necessarily flexible approach
taken by the Court.
The resulting need for clarification was quickly undertaken. Re-
acting to the compilation of extensive economic data encouraged by Brown
Shoe, the Court in Philadelphia National Bank shifted the burden of
proof in cases involving extreme market shares. Yet the Court appears
to have determined that to extend this approach beyond the fairly
obvious cases would impose a well-nigh impossible burden upon the
merging companies. Thus, a continuation of prolonged litigation can
be expected in the majority of cases.
A more questionable development is the Court's failure to inject even
a minimum degree of certainty into the process of selecting the appropriate
line of commerce. The several criteria listed in Brown Shoe suggest a
variety of possible sub-markets for any given merger. And the govern-
ment has been quick to seize the opportunity thus presented. For it is
possible to gerrymander the boundaries of the broad market involved so
as to insure the desired result.
The definition of the relevant market clearly presents a significant
problem. While the avowed purpose of the Court to recognize competition
where it in fact exists cannot be criticized, the ease with which the
government has been allowed to manipulate the concept of sub-markets
must be halted. The apparently inconsistent decisions on this issue only
serve to emphasize the current instability.
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In the brief period following Brown Shoe the Court has continuously
broadened the scope of the Amended Section. Banking and other regu-
lated industries, joint-ventures, and the mere acquisition of a trade
name have been included thus far. And in the latest case considered, a
new test was developed in order to reach certain types of conglomerate
mergers previously considered by some to be beyond the reach of Section
7. While there was doubt expressed as to whether all of these areas
would be included, it would seem that the Court reached the most
logical conclusion. For even if Congress did not intend to specifically
include one or more of these areas, the Court's decisions will implement
the broad legislative policy of maintaining an economic way of life.
Indeed, this willingness on the part of the Court to. advance Congress'
goal of preserving an economic way of life has been the motivating factor
behind recent decisions. It has caused the Court to reject a variety of
economic arguments as wholly irrelevant. Thus the "other factors" listed
in Brown Shoe take on added significance. For in any questionable
merger a demonstration that one or more of these beneficial effects will
result may be determinative. Conversly a failure to show that "compe-
tition" will in some way be enhanced will probably cause the Court
to proscribe the merger.
In short, the basic policy of the Court is clear, and arguments
which conflict with the legislative design must fail. Only by accepting
this framework and developing the various defenses suggested by the
Court can the merger defendant expect to achieve the desired result.
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